

tions mean that these countries lack the bureaucracies, police, and armies that a state of law and a democracy need. Because habits of violence, distrust, and lack of social solidarity pervade these unhappy nations, the transition to democracy or even to stable authoritarianism will not be easy. There lies the biggest challenge both to democrats in these countries and to outside forces that want to encourage democracy in the Third World.

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Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes

Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives

Richard Snyder

Sultanistic regimes command great interest both in the literature on social revolutions and in the literature on regime transitions. Students of revolutionary change are interested in sultanistic regimes because so many are linked to the rare phenomenon of social revolution. For example, the sultanistic regimes of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, all of which were toppled by revolutionaries, have been analyzed comparatively by numerous scholars seeking to specify the causes of revolution. These three cases have led students of revolution to identify sultanistic dictatorships as one of the regime types most vulnerable to revolution.¹

Students of regime transitions, on the other hand, have been drawn to the set of sultanistic regimes because it contains numerous nondemocratic hold-outs—regimes that have resisted the wave of democratization that has swept the globe during the past two decades.² Cases such as Haiti and Zaire, where democratization has stalled or been stillborn, are of interest because studying them can shed light on factors at work in failed transitions.

Successful transitions to democracy such as occurred in the Philippines after Marcos pose puzzles for students of both revolutions and transitions. The combined presence of a sultanistic regime and a powerful revolutionary opposition in the Philippines under Marcos make it a “most likely” case of revolu-

tion and a "least likely" case of democratization. Hence the absence of revolution and the presence of a moderately successful transition to democracy are equally surprising.

The location of the set of sultanistic regimes at the intersection of these literatures is especially intriguing given the starkly different analytic goals and explanatory modes characteristic of the two. Much of the recent literature on social revolutions has sought to identify types of states or social formations vulnerable to revolutionary collapse, typically employing *structural* explanations that focus on the causal role of impersonal, objective social relationships.³ Much of the recent literature on regime transitions, by contrast, has sought to identify types of nondemocratic regimes susceptible to democratization, usually relying on *voluntarist* explanations that emphasize the contingent choices of elite actors during processes of regime change.⁴

In response to criticisms that the emphasis on structural explanations understates the role of political action in making (or failing to make) revolutions, students of revolutionary change have recently sought to incorporate the efficacy of human action into their analyses alongside structural causal factors.⁵ Similarly, in response to criticisms that the emphasis on voluntarist explanations understates the causal role of structural factors, students of transitions have been seeking to link political action to structural constraints in analyses of regime change.⁶ Thus the two literatures appear to be moving toward each other as they both search for explanations that integrate human agency and social structure. Unfortunately, scholarly recognition of this convergence has been obscured in part by disciplinary boundaries, which tend to insulate students of states and revolutions from students of regimes and transitions.⁷

The intersection of the two literatures in their shared focus on sultanistic regimes offers an opportunity to transcend disciplinary partitions and bridge these two literatures.⁸ To this end I introduce a framework for analyzing the dynamics of sultanistic regimes that seeks to combine the strengths of both literatures by uniting a focus on structural factors with a focus on political action and historical contingency. I then use this integrative framework to account for the varied paths of political development traversed by sultanistic regimes.

The cases chosen for analysis exemplify a variety of possible trajectories for sultanistic regimes: revolution, as in the cases of Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, and Batista in Cuba; nonrevolutionary transition to civilian rule, as in the cases of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania⁹; and transition to military dictatorship, as in the case of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti. The cases of Mobutu Sese Seko in

Zaire until 1991 and François Duvalier in Haiti exemplify the remarkable longevity and stability of some sultanistic regimes.¹⁰

A Framework for Explaining Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes

I take two steps to construct an integrative framework that combines structural and voluntarist perspectives in the analysis of transitions from sultanistic regimes. First, to overcome the structural determinism for which the literature on revolutions has been criticized, I define the actors relevant to the transformation of sultanistic regimes in a manner that does not reduce them to passive carriers of fixed interests and identities derived from positions in institutional or social structures. Since political actors are not automatons who mechanically play parts demanded of them by structures, the groups who participate in the transformation of sultanistic regimes must be defined in a way that is sensitive to actors' abilities to shift strategic postures and take advantage of margins of maneuverability within structural constraints. To meet this challenge, I define the actors relevant to transitions from sultanistic regimes according to strategic postures rather than by institutional or structural roles.¹¹

Second, to overcome the extreme voluntarism for which the regime transitions literature has been criticized, I do not assume that regime change is always a fluid process in which actors have broad discretion. Instead, for each case I map the institutional and social structures that are the strategic contexts in which these actors operate in order to pinpoint precisely how much room, if any, exists for strategic maneuvering.¹²

Defining the Actors Who Make Transitions

Four domestic groups are relevant for analyzing the dynamics of sultanistic regimes: regime hard-liners, regime soft-liners, the moderate opposition, and the maximalist opposition.¹³ Regime hard-liners are unconditionally committed to perpetuating the dictator's rule. They prefer to go down with the ship rather than exit gracefully and therefore must be forced to give up power. This group typically includes the ruling clique—that is, the dictator and his immediate circle of cronies—but may extend to other actors within the state who are not part of this ruling inner circle.

Soft-liners are the other main actors within the regime. They perceive their survival to be separable from the dictator's and, especially during times of crisis, may come to view their association with him as more a liability than a benefit. Hence they may seek to sever their ties with the dictator, perhaps

turning against him in hopes that they themselves may seize power. This group often includes factions of the military or members of the state's administrative bureaucracy alienated by the dictator's interference with their autonomy and professionalism.¹⁴

Two categories are also relevant for analyzing opposition to sultanistic regimes. The maximalist opposition abhors allying with any regime incumbents and is committed to goals that extend far beyond simply removing the dictator. Maximalists seek to overthrow the existing regime and seize control of the state. Their agenda often involves radically transforming state and society as well as restructuring the nation's links with the international system. This group typically consists of revolutionary organizations.¹⁵

The moderate opposition, on the other hand, is committed to the limited goal of ousting the dictator and his ruling clique. Members typically will ally with whichever group can forward this objective. Thus, in contrast to maximalists, they are willing to support or join regime soft-liners seeking to overthrow the dictator. Since moderates prefer groups that share their minimal agenda of removing the dictator over groups with plans for radical change, regime soft-liners are usually their first-choice allies. However, if regime soft-liners are absent or are perceived to be incapable of ousting the dictator, moderates may choose to ally with maximalists, who are seen to share at least their objective of removing the dictator. Moderates are not necessarily a democratic opposition—their immediate goal is simply to replace the sultanistic dictator's arbitrary rule with a more predictable, institutionalized regime. The moderate group typically includes domestic economic elites shut out of the dictator's patronage network and alienated by the disruptive effects on their business activities of the dictator's arbitrary and unpredictable use of power. These "noncrony" elites often resent the personal enrichment of the ruler and his family and seek to dissolve the fusion of public and private created by the sultanistic regime.¹⁶

The presence of hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, and maximalists cannot be assumed in all cases of sultanism.¹⁷ Any combination of these groups may be absent or extremely weak because the varying structural characteristics of sultanistic regimes shape the political space within which they can organize and hence condition the possibilities for their very existence. Even when there is structural space for the organization of one or more of these groups, they do not necessarily form because, for a variety of reasons, actors do not always take advantage of structural opportunities.¹⁸ And when moderates, maximalists, hard-liners, or soft-liners *do* organize, their strategies, relative strengths, and coalitional options are critically shaped by the structural context in which they operate.

Mapping the Structural Contexts of Transitions

The structural factors relevant for explaining the dynamics of sultanistic regimes can be deduced from the core defining feature of this type of regime: the ruler's maintenance of authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology, charisma, or impersonal law.¹⁹ The central role of patronage in these regimes creates an authority structure that is radial in nature, with the dictator occupying a central hub that is linked via patronage spokes to clients both within the state and in civil society.²⁰ In addition, sultanistic dictators are frequently themselves clients of foreign powers, especially superpower patrons such as the United States. Thus three critical relationships capture the varied structural dynamics of sultanistic regimes: the ruler's relationship to state institutions; the ruler's relationship to domestic societal elites; and the relationship of domestic actors (that is, hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, and maximalists) to foreign powers.

Ruler-State Relations

The degree to which the patronage network radiating from the ruler penetrates state institutions—especially the military—tends to be uneven and to fluctuate over time. There is often an ongoing struggle between the dictator, who seeks to wrest autonomy from state institutions, and incumbents of these institutions, who seek to retain autonomy. When state institutions are thoroughly penetrated by the dictator's patronage network, the political space for the emergence of regime soft-liners is minimal, and the ruling clique and the state are essentially fused into a unitary, hard-line actor. By contrast, when state institutions are insulated from the dictator's patronage network, the structural potential exists for soft-liners to organize within these institutions and oppose the dictator.

How far the ruler has undermined the autonomy of the armed forces through patronage (for example, by subverting its organizational hierarchy and replacing it with a hierarchy based on loyalty to his person, and by dividing the officer corps) is a critical variable that differentiates cases of transition from sultanism where the impetus for political change comes from above, within the incumbent regime, from cases where it originates from below, involving societal actors outside the regime. When segments of the armed forces have *not* been thoroughly divided and co-opted by the dictator and are capable of autonomous action against him—as in the Philippines, Haiti, and Romania—a military coup, with or without civilian support, may remove the dictator. Where the military lacks sufficient autonomy to act independently of the dictator—as

in Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Zaire—the possibility for political transformation hinges on the efforts of maximalist opposition groups with the coercive resources necessary to defeat the dictator's loyal military. Hence, in such cases political change tends to be violent and revolutionary if it occurs at all.

To assess the degree of military autonomy, we can examine whether the armed forces have control over the supply of their matériel, the ability of officers to predict their career paths and to communicate discontent with one another, how completely the officer corps is divided along ethnic or regional lines, and the dictator's capacity to purge elements of the armed forces whose loyalty he questions.²¹ In Zaire, for example, Mobutu's efforts to divide the military through frequent rotation of officers, periodic purges of the officer corps, and exploitation of ethnoregional tensions minimized the space within which soft-liners could organize and consequently reduced the armed forces' capacity to turn against him.

When assessing military autonomy we must also consider whether the dictator has a paramilitary force that functions as a counterbalance to the regular armed forces and whose members infiltrate and spy on the military. In Haiti, François Duvalier's Tonton Macoutes were such a force. Their infiltration of the armed forces and Duvalier's purges of the officer corps minimized the Haitian military's capacity for autonomous action during his rule. Such institutional counterweights that limit the discretion of the regular armed forces are not always paramilitary. For example, Ceaușescu used the Romanian Communist Party in addition to the Securitate, the secret police, as an effective check against military coup d'état.

By contrast, Marcos's attempts to undermine the autonomy of the Philippine armed forces by packing the officer corps with individuals loyal to his person were less successful than the measures taken by Mobutu and François Duvalier. Pockets of institutional autonomy, clustered around career officers, remained within the Philippine military despite Marcos's efforts to subordinate it. Many of these career officers, who had worked their way up through the established hierarchy, became disgruntled by Marcos's dilution of the military's professionalism. These disenchanted officers were able to organize a movement within the armed forces to restore its integrity and discipline. This organization, the Reform the Armed Forces Now Movement (RAM), served as a cover for plotting the abortive coup that triggered Marcos's overthrow in 1986.

The dictator's discretion plays a key role in both the creation and transformation of the ruler-military relationship. Although all sultanistic rulers are compelled to devise mechanisms for securing the loyalty, or at least acquiescence, of the military, they can employ a range of strategies to achieve this

objective.²² Two alternative ruler survival strategies vis-à-vis the military warrant consideration here because they seem to have important ramifications for future processes of transition from sultanism. Anchoring the ruler-military relationship in the dictator's choices and strategies underscores the role of human agency in both the creation and the reproduction of this "objective" relationship.²³

The first strategy, exemplified by François Duvalier's use of the Tonton Macoutes, is to transfer primary responsibility for applying state violence to a loyal paramilitary force, stripping the regular military of virtually all security functions.²⁴ Although this strategy can reduce the short-term possibility of challenges to the dictator from within the regime, it can paradoxically promote such challenges over the long term. Since the regular military is isolated and not a full-fledged participant in the regime, it can easily come to view its survival as independent from the dictator's, especially when, as in the case of Haiti, power is transferred to a son of the dictator whose competence to rule is perceived as questionable. And perhaps more important, because responsibility for performing the bulk of the dictator's "dirty work" rests with the paramilitary guard, *not* the regular military, in the eyes of the population the armed forces may remain relatively untarnished by the regime's abuses. Thus in Haiti, during the overthrow of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986, shouts of "long live the army" by civilian protesters against Jean-Claude Duvalier could be heard on several occasions, and some viewed the military as an ally that could help deliver the nation from the Duvalier regime.²⁵

The second strategy for neutralizing the threat of a military coup is exemplified by Mobutu, who took strong measures to undermine the capacity of the Zairian armed forces to turn against him, yet continued to rely on them to maintain internal control. This strategy closely intertwines the military's survival with the dictator's, encourages predatory behavior by the armed forces against civil society, and weakens their legitimacy with the population. Consequently, the chances are slim that the military will turn against the dictator and that, if it does, it will be able to participate in a legitimate, interim "caretaker" government that oversees a smooth transition from sultanism. These two factors increase the likelihood that transitions from sultanism will be violent.²⁶

Ruler-Society Relations

Sultanistic regimes vary in how far the patronage network penetrates civil society, co-opting societal elites through material rewards. The degree of inclusion of domestic elites within the patronage network influences the growth of both maximalist and moderate oppositions. When the dictator's patronage

network is inclusive, penetrating deeply into society, political space for opposition groups is narrow because these vertical patron-client linkages both co-opt elites and extend the reach of the state's surveillance and control. By contrast, when the dictator excludes domestic elites from his patronage network, state penetration into society is relatively shallow, opening political space for the growth of opposition.²⁷

François Duvalier in Haiti, Somoza García in Nicaragua, and Ceaușescu in Romania limited the growth of opposition by constructing extensive patronage networks that co-opted societal elites. The combination of elite inclusion and deep state penetration of society contributed to the longevity and stability of these regimes. The breakdown of sultanism in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Romania was due in large part to the prior unraveling of these patronage networks and to a corresponding increase in the exclusion of political elites.

By contrast, Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, and Batista in Cuba unintentionally encouraged the growth of opposition by excluding domestic elites from political power and economic patronage.²⁸ Alienation of elites encouraged formation of broad and effective coalitions of convenience between moderates and maximalists, in part because the armed forces in these three cases had been thoroughly co-opted and divided by the ruler and consequently were incapable of autonomous action against him. The absence of military soft-liners within these regimes pushed the moderate opposition to ally with revolutionary maximalists who had the military or organizational capability to unseat the dictator and his subservient army.²⁹ Robert Dix has argued persuasively that the ability of maximalists to construct such broad coalitions was a key cause of revolution in Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In each case the maximalists, who had coercive and organizational resources superior to those of their moderate allies, easily dominated these coalitions and used the moderates as stepping-stones to state power, turning against them after the common goal of removing the dictator had been achieved.³⁰

Exclusionary sultanistic dictatorships are not always toppled by revolution.³¹ First, they do not necessarily confront significant maximalist or moderate oppositions. Organizational difficulties, the absence of political cultures of opposition, the lack of effective leaders, and state repression can all hinder the emergence of potent opposition movements even in an exclusionary environment.³² For example, would-be maximalist and moderate opponents in Jean-Claude Duvalier's Haiti were frustrated by organizational problems and by the debilitating legacy of years of repression. Second, even if maximalists have not been killed and have been able to organize, they may choose not to pursue a strategy of armed confrontation. Or they may be incapable of defeating the

dictator's armed forces in battle, especially if the military has some organizational coherence. Third, if there are soft-line segments of the armed forces with the ability to act autonomously against the dictator, a coalition of moderate civilian opposition groups and disgruntled segments of the military, or elements of the military acting alone, may seize power and block revolution even when a powerful maximalist opposition does exist. Marcos's overthrow exemplifies this pattern of a military-moderate alliance blocking a powerful maximalist movement.

On the other hand, the exclusionary regimes of Somoza, Batista, and the Shah were toppled by revolution. This occurred because powerful revolutionary movements emerged against them, the armed forces were unable to act against the dictator, and consequently moderates lacked potential soft-line allies and chose to ally with the revolutionaries. The resulting broad coalitions dominated by the maximalists were able to seize power when these dictators fled and "their" armies unraveled.

That a sultanistic regime excludes societal elites from patronage benefits cannot by itself predict whether that regime will move toward revolution, as in Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba; will experience a military coup, as in Haiti; or will undergo a transition to civilian rule, as in the Philippines. To explain how a highly exclusionary sultanistic regime is displaced, we must also examine the organizational capacities and strategic choices of maximalist and moderate opposition groups, the coalition options available to moderates (especially whether autonomous soft-line military factions are available as allies), and the dictator's ability to counter challenges to his control of the state.

To sum up, sultanistic regimes that effectively co-opt societal elites through patronage networks can inhibit the growth of both maximalist and moderate oppositions. Consequently, depending on the military's capacity and desire to oust the dictator, they tend to be relatively stable and long-lived. On the other hand, sultanistic regimes that exclude elites from patronage and limit it to a small clique surrounding the ruler tend to encourage the growth of opposition and are generally unstable. Revolution is the likely outcome of this instability in cases such as Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba, where a coherent revolutionary movement challenges the dictator and where military soft-liners are absent. Military dictatorship is the probable outcome in cases like Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier, where no coherent maximalist or moderate oppositions organize against the exclusionary dictator and where military soft-liners have the ability to turn against him and fill the vacuum of power created by his flight into exile. Civilian rule is the likely outcome in cases such as the Philippines, where a powerful moderate opposition and a revolt by military soft-liners can dislodge

the dictator and enable the civilian opposition to take control without opening the way for a seizure of power by maximalists.

Foreign Power—Domestic Actor Relations

Analyses of transitions from authoritarian rule have tended to focus on domestic, internal factors, downplaying the role of international actors in the explanation of regime change. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, such a domestic focus is justified because "it seems fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse."³³ In the analysis of transitions from sultanistic regimes, however, a focus on international actors is crucial. As I noted earlier, sultanistic dictators are often dependent on foreign patrons, who supply critical military aid and material resources that can help fuel their domestic patronage networks.³⁴ Furthermore, moderate and maximalist groups opposed to these dictators frequently receive assistance from foreign actors (often from former patrons of the dictator). For these reasons, considering the role of international actors seems more essential for analyzing transitions from sultanism than for analyzing transitions from other types of nondemocratic regimes.³⁵

I am not implying that international forces alone determine the developmental trajectories of sultanistic regimes. The impact of these forces is mediated by the configuration of domestic actors (for example, the presence or absence of intraregime and societal opposition groups) and by the willingness of domestic actors (especially the incumbent dictator) to participate in the schemes of foreign powers. Short of invasion, foreign powers can influence transitions from sultanism by strengthening the capacities of various domestic actors and shaping the menu of political strategies they can choose from, thus reducing or enhancing their maneuverability. Changes in international support for the dictator or opposition groups, for example, may affect the perceived costs and payoffs of particular strategies, thereby influencing the choices of actors during moments of regime change.

In Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba, the dictator's extreme dependence on superpower patronage contributed to the success of the maximalist opposition. According to Farideh Farhi and Jack Goldstone, Batista's, Somoza's, and the Shah's extreme reliance on U.S. support encouraged revolution because this support promoted exclusionary and repressive regime behavior by providing military and economic resources, which allowed the ruler to detach his repressive state apparatus from its social base and dispense with domestic coalition building. U.S. support also frustrated the nationalist ambitions of elites and undermined

the rulers' control during times of crisis because the United States insisted on liberalizing reforms and limited coercion.³⁶

Although dependence on U.S. support contributed to the revolutionary overthrow of the Shah, Somoza, and Batista, the extreme dependence of a sultanistic ruler on a foreign power does not necessarily encourage revolution, and may even inhibit it. When the dictator is heavily dependent on a superpower patron that can identify and support an acceptable and cooperative alternative (usually regime soft-liners or moderate opposition groups), that patron may be able to use its leverage to remove the dictator from office in times of crisis and ease the acceptable opposition into power. In this way a superpower patron can inhibit revolution by defusing a crisis that, if allowed to continue, might strengthen the hand of maximalists and provide an opportunity for them to seize power. The United States was able to "manage" the transitions in the Philippines and in Haiti by exerting pressure on Marcos and Jean-Claude Duvalier and by switching its support to the civilian moderate opposition, led by Corazon Aquino, in the Philippines, and to military soft-liners, led by General Henri Namphy, in Haiti. Conversely, in Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba, the United States was unable to find an acceptable, viable alternative to the incumbent dictator and contributed to its client's revolutionary overthrow by pursuing a destabilizing "human rights policy" intended to limit the dictator's use of coercion through the threat of withholding vital military and economic assistance.

How dependent sultanistic rulers are on foreign patrons varies significantly from case to case. For example, during the mid-1960s, François Duvalier received virtually no foreign assistance, and consequently outside influence on his regime was minimal. Sultanistic rulers can also limit the leverage external actors have over them by diversifying sources of foreign support to avoid overdependence on a single patron. Mobutu and Ceaușescu used this strategy and benefited from the military and economic aid of various supporters without becoming vulnerable to their policy preferences. When foreign actors have limited leverage over the dictator, their ability to influence the course of political development is restricted to supporting the dictator's opposition or to intervening directly.³⁷

To sum up, the framework introduced above for explaining transitions from sultanism consists of two procedures that combine structural and voluntarist approaches to the study of regime change. First, the actors who participate in transitions from sultanistic regimes are defined in a way that highlights their ability to shift strategic postures within the margins of maneuverability allowed by structural constraints. Second, these margins of maneuverability are spec-

ified by analyzing three critical relationships—ruler-state (especially ruler-military), ruler-society, and foreign power—domestic actor—that define the structural contexts of transitions from sultanism. Taken together, these two procedures constitute an integrative framework that links structural constraints to the shaping of political action in the analysis of regime change.

Alternative Paths of Political Development for Sultanistic Regimes

In the following sections, the integrative framework is used to account for the multiple paths of political development for sultanistic regimes: political stability, revolution, military dictatorship, and civilian rule. The case analyses are organized around the structural variables that define contexts of action: the relationships of rulers to the military, of rulers to elites, and of domestic actors

TABLE 3.1
Structural Characteristics of Sultanistic Regimes

Cases	Penetration of State by Ruler's Patronage Network	Penetration of Society by Ruler's Patronage Network	Ruler's Dependence on a Single Superpower Patron	Regime Outcomes
Zaire until 1990; Haiti under François Duvalier	High	High	Low	Political stability
Nicaragua under Somoza García	High	High	High	Political stability
Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua under Somoza Debayle	High	Low	High	Revolution
Zaire after 1990; Panama prior to 1989 U.S. invasion	High	Low	Low	Civil conflict between dictator and societal opposition
Romania after 1985	Low	Low	Low	Military coup leading to rule by civilian soft-liners
Philippines; Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier	Low	Low	High	Military coup leading to rule by civilian moderates in Philippines; military coup leading to rule by military soft-liners in Haiti.
No cases	Low	High	Low	
No cases	Low	High	High	

TABLE 3.2
Relative Strengths of Domestic Oppositions to Sultanistic Dictators

Cases	Strength of Regime Soft-liners	Strength of Moderate Opposition	Strength of Maximalist Opposition	Regime Outcomes
Zaire until 1990; Haiti under François Duvalier; Nicaragua under Somoza García	Absent	Low	Low	Political stability
Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua under Somoza Debayle	Absent	Low	High	Revolution
Zaire 1991–95; Panama before 1989 U.S. invasion	Absent	Medium	Low	Civil conflict between dictator and moderates
Romania after 1985; Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier	High	Low	Low	Military coup leading to rule by civilian soft-liners in Romania and by military soft-liners in Haiti
Philippines	High	High	High	Military coup leading to rule by moderates

to foreign powers. Where these structural factors created opportunities for strategic maneuvering, the analysis probes whether and how actors took advantage of these opportunities.

An analysis of tables 3.1 and 3.2 underscores the importance of examining *both* the structural contexts of transitions *and* actors' responses to opportunities for strategic maneuvering within these contexts. Together these two perspectives are used to explain alternative paths of development for sultanistic regimes. Table 3.1 summarizes the structural characteristics of the cases and reveals that variations in structural features of sultanistic regimes cannot by themselves explain alternative paths of transition. For example, in the cases of Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier and the Philippines under Marcos, *similar* structural characteristics are associated with quite *different* outcomes of transitions from sultanism: Duvalier's ouster resulted in a military dictatorship, whereas that of Marcos resulted in rule by civilian moderates. And in the cases of Nicaragua under Somoza García and Haiti under François Duvalier, *different* structural characteristics are associated with the *similar* outcome of political stability.

Table 3.2 summarizes the relative strengths of domestic opposition groups. The similarities between the clustering of cases in tables 3.1 and 3.2 reveal the important influence that the structural characteristics of sultanistic regimes can have on the strength of domestic oppositions. However, a comparison of the

tables also suggests that the structural characteristics of sultanistic regimes cannot fully explain the strength of opposition groups. For example, Marcos's regime in the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier's in Haiti had similar structural characteristics, yet moderate and maximalist oppositions were strong in the Philippines and weak in Haiti. Likewise, Ceaușescu's regime in Romania and Jean-Claude Duvalier's in Haiti had different structural characteristics, yet the relative strengths of oppositions were similar in these cases.³⁸ As the case analyses will reveal, we must consider the strategies and organizational abilities of would-be regime opponents in order to account for such unpredictable responses to structural opportunities for building opposition movements.

Political Stability

The extreme personalism and low levels of institutionalization of sultanistic regimes have led some observers to conclude that these regimes are highly unstable and fragile.³⁹ However, the set of sultanistic regimes includes some of world's longest-lived and most resilient governments. The Duvalier dynasty lasted thirty years, and the Somoza dynasty endured more than forty, with smooth transfers of power from fathers to sons in both cases. The analysis below focuses on the regimes of François Duvalier in Haiti and Mobutu in Zaire in order to identify the factors that seem to explain the durability of some sultanistic regimes.

Based on these two cases, sultanistic regimes with ongoing stability seem characterized by extensive penetration of both state *and* society by the dictator's patronage network, allowing little space for the organization of opposition either within or outside the regime. The absence of soft-liners and civilian opposition in these cases makes regime hard-liners the sole players in the domestic political arena. In addition, the hard-liners who preside over such stable games of political solitaire tend to avoid extreme dependence on a single superpower patron.

Haiti: François Duvalier

François Duvalier consolidated his regime by decimating his opponents and constructing a patronage network based on the black, rural middle class, composed of peasants with medium-sized landholdings. According to David Nicholls, "a whole structure of dependence and patronage" had developed in the Haitian countryside, which was dominated by this black middle class.⁴⁰ By securing the backing of this key group through patronage, Duvalier took advantage of the existing power structure in the countryside, where 80 percent of the Haitian population resided, to extend the reach of his state into the inter-

stices of Haitian society. Since the middle class was the main potential support base for would-be moderate opponents to Duvalier, its inclusion in his patronage network restricted the growth of moderate opposition.⁴¹ By extending state penetration of civil society, furthermore, Duvalier's co-optation of black elites worked in conjunction with his personal paramilitary organization—the Tonton Macoutes (the bulk of whose leadership was drawn from the rural middle class)⁴²—to prevent effective moderate or maximalist mobilization against him.

The army had dominated Haitian politics for 150 years before Duvalier's rule, and he was keenly aware that most of his predecessors had been deposed by the military. To ensure that he too would not fall victim to a military coup, Duvalier took immediate steps to undermine the autonomy of the armed forces. He purged the officer corps, unified the armed services under his personal authority, and created an elite Presidential Guard billeted at the presidential palace.⁴³ Duvalier also used the Tonton Macoutes as a counterweight to the military. By the time of the dictator's death in 1971, one Haitian in twenty was estimated to be affiliated with the Macoutes; by comparison, the entire armed forces numbered only seven thousand.⁴⁴ By 1964, Duvalier was able to claim with justification, "I have removed from the army its role of arbiter of national life."⁴⁵

Duvalier also maintained significant autonomy from foreign powers. Between 1962 and 1966, foreign aid was virtually cut off in reaction to the regime's repression. Because he did not depend on foreign support, Duvalier was relatively insulated from external pressures for political reform.⁴⁶ The United States and other international actors had limited leverage over him short of direct destabilization or invasion. In any event, since Duvalier was a reliable Cold War ally, the United States was minimally concerned with influencing Haitian politics.

By the mid-1960s, Duvalier's insulation from foreign powers, his balanced use of co-optation and repression, and his subordination of the armed forces had minimized the political space for the organization of opposition. According to Nicholls, "The army officers, the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, the U.S. embassy, the business elite, the intellectuals, the trade union leadership, one by one had their wings clipped."⁴⁷ The stability of the elder Duvalier's rule and the smooth transfer of power in 1971 to his son Jean-Claude were products of this environment equally devoid of maximalists, moderates, and soft-liners. Jean-Claude's rule, which will be discussed shortly, did not enjoy such stability.

Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko

Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's dictator, was in power for over thirty years. Until 1991 Mobutu's rule, like François Duvalier's, was characterized by remarkable

political stability. In the middle of 1991, however, this stability gave way to conflict and stalemate between a weak moderate opposition and regime hard-liners. This discussion identifies the factors that seem to explain this prolonged stability and highlights the changes in these factors associated with its recent breakdown.

The ongoing stability of Mobutu's regime before 1990 was a consequence of the co-optation of elites, brutal repression, and the exacerbation of ethnic and regional divisions by state patronage, all of which effectively inhibited the growth of both maximalist and moderate oppositions; the undermining of the armed forces' institutional autonomy, which eliminated the political space for soft-line opposition; and Mobutu's ability to extract vital military and economic assistance from foreign patrons while limiting the leverage these patrons had over him by diversifying his sources of external support. As a result, the structural spaces within which maximalists, moderates, and soft-liners could organize were minimal: hence, *stasis*.

Like François Duvalier, Mobutu limited the growth of opposition by co-opting elites through an extensive patronage network that bound members of the dominant political-commercial class to the state. The core of his patronage system was the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), Zaire's only legal political organization until 1990. Mobutu's patronage network was characterized by such frequent circulation of elites that observers have likened Zaire's politics to a "game of 'musical chairs.'"⁴⁸ This circulation atomized Zairian elites by pressuring them to focus exclusively on self-aggrandizement during the short period when they had access to state power and perquisites. Schatzberg writes that, according to the "'rules' of Zairian politics, it [was] better to profit while possible to insure oneself and one's family a bit of security after the fall."⁴⁹

In addition to inhibiting elite opposition, state patronage worked against the solidarity of opposition groups when they did arise by exacerbating regional and ethnic identities, thereby fragmenting civil society and impeding broad-based mobilization against Mobutu. Young and Turner describe how the patrimonial structure of Mobutu's state discouraged collective action in pursuit of state resources by reinforcing particularistic divisions within society:

Access to the state on the part of civil society is more efficaciously secured by penetrating its softened shell by means of a patron-client net, in pursuit of immediate, particularized advantage, rather than by assaulting its bastions through formal pursuit of the general interest. Affinities of kinship and ethnicity supply the ideological cement for clientage links between state and society. . . . An "economy of affection" . . . infiltrates the state and defines the terms of its relationships with society.⁵⁰

Limited social mobility, a consequence of economic stagnation in the 1970s, made these "economies of affection" especially important, because using kinship, ethnic, and regional affiliations to establish ties to a patron was virtually the only avenue of upward mobility. Elites encouraged and exploited regional and ethnic identities to help them construct support bases that they used to extract state resources.⁵¹ This politicizing of ethnicity, kinship, and regionalism by Mobutu's patronage network splintered civil society and limited the possibilities for mobilizing against him.

The ethnoregional patron-client networks further hampered the organizational efforts of Mobutu's opponents by preventing the polarization of society into "haves" and "have-nots," as occurred in cases such as Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Philippines. In Zaire, in contrast to these other cases where patronage was restricted to a small group of the dictator's cronies, an important third category existed: those "have-nots" who could claim regional or kinship affiliations with the "haves." This third category significantly widened the perimeter of Mobutu's patronage circle and limited the appeal of opposition movements.

Co-optation of elites, the fragmenting effects of state patronage in civil society, and Mobutu's selective use of coercion against those who voiced dissatisfaction with his regime effectively stifled internal opposition. According to Turner, in 1987 "there was no shortage of opposition parties, but these were based outside the country and seemed unlikely to pose a significant threat to the regime."⁵²

Mobutu neutralized the threat of a military coup by maintaining close personal control over the armed forces, encouraging rivalries among officer factions, and purging officers deemed untrustworthy. With these tactics he prevented formation of pockets of autonomy within the armed forces that could serve as breeding grounds for soft-line factions. Arthur House likens Mobutu to the "center of a spoked wheel" in his relations with the military. According to House, Mobutu maintained his supremacy over the military's command structure by rotating officers frequently and by encouraging them to report rumors to him personally.⁵³ Young and Turner observe that, in addition to creating an extensive patronage network, Mobutu controlled the military by fostering and exploiting rivalries among factions of officers, defined in terms of ethnic or regional identity, institutional affiliation, generations, and levels of training.⁵⁴ To ensure the loyalty of the military's top echelons, Mobutu packed their ranks with officers from his home region of Equateur.⁵⁵ Also, purges of the officer corps were frequent; in 1978 over two hundred of the most promising junior officers—nearly 10 percent of the officer corps—were dismissed because Mobutu doubted their reliability.⁵⁶

Mobutu's resilience was also due to substantial military and economic assistance from an assortment of foreign patrons (including at various times China, France, Morocco, Belgium, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, and the United States).⁵⁷ These foreign powers gave vital economic assistance, which helped fuel Mobutu's patronage network. Foreign powers even intervened militarily to prop up the Mobutu regime against armed invasion. In 1977 and again in 1978, Moroccan troops (assisted in 1978 by French and Belgian troops) came to Mobutu's aid when the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) proved incapable of repelling incursions of a mere 1,500 to 2,000 meagerly equipped mercenaries from Angola into the Shaba region of Zaire.⁵⁸

Mobutu was able to take advantage of the patronage of foreign powers without incurring the "cost" of extreme vulnerability to the policy preferences of a specific backer. By diversifying his sources of external support he limited the leverage these supporters individually had over him. In an interesting role reversal (a case of the tail wagging the dog), Mobutu was able to squeeze resources out of his foreign backers with minimal reciprocal obligations by exploiting Zaire's strategic and economic importance and using the threat of chaos if his regime was to collapse.⁵⁹ As Young and Turner put it, the "Mobutu or chaos" formula unfailingly brought Western powers to the dictator's rescue.⁶⁰ Mobutu was also adept at performing what Thomas Callaghy called the "ritual dance of the debt game."⁶¹ This dance ensured continued inflow of the development loans and other economic aid Mobutu needed to maintain his patronage network.

In 1991 the ongoing political stability in Zaire was shattered by mass riots and protests against Mobutu that plunged the country into chaos, hence disproving the "Mobutu or chaos" formula. This protest was motivated both by the country's worsening economic crisis and by the emergence of an invigorated moderate opposition after Mobutu lifted a twenty-year ban on opposition parties in April 1990.⁶² In September 1991 Mobutu agreed to share power with the moderate opposition, assenting to the appointment of Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister.⁶³ However, Tshisekedi, a fierce Mobutu opponent since 1980 and leader of the largest opposition group, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, was dismissed by Mobutu three weeks later, triggering another cycle of rioting.⁶⁴ Constitutional negotiations between Mobutu and the moderate opposition resumed in April 1992. Yet in spite of significant international pressure to relinquish power, as of 1994 Mobutu continued to refuse to transfer authority to a transitional government.

The following factors help account for the breakdown of stability and its replacement by a stalemate between hard-liners and a weak moderate opposi-

tion. In terms of ruler-society relations, Mobutu's patronage network penetrating civil society appears to have broken down largely because of the withdrawal of foreign assistance, opening political space for moderates to organize inside Zaire for the first time in decades. Moderates took advantage of this opening, but their organizational efforts were impeded by the fragmenting legacies of thirty years of sultanism. Internal divisions among them were common, and Mobutu was still able to use patronage to exacerbate these divisions and "drive a deep wedge into the forces of the opposition."⁶⁵

In terms of ruler-state relations, by contrast, Mobutu's penetration and control of the state seem to have remained more solid: the Zairian military brutally harassed moderate opposition leaders and fired on anti-Mobutu protesters on several occasions.⁶⁶ Hence moderates continued to lack potential soft-line allies.

In terms of the role of foreign powers, Mobutu's outside patrons have shifted their support to the moderate opposition. The winding down of the Angolan civil war and the disappearance of Soviet influence in Africa with the end of the Cold War reduced Mobutu's usefulness as an ally, encouraging the United States, France, and Belgium collectively to end aid and lead international efforts to force his ouster.⁶⁷ This withdrawal of foreign support contributed to the breakdown of Mobutu's patronage linkages with civil society.

In sum, structural changes in ruler-society relations opened space for societal opposition, which moderates used to organize. However, maximalist groups remained weak and did not take advantage of this structural space. At the same time continuities in ruler-state relations inhibited the emergence of regime soft-liners. The resulting stalemate between regime hard-liners and opposition moderates lasted until the civil war between Hutus and Tutsis in neighboring Rwanda spilled over into Zaire.⁶⁸ When Rwandan militias active among the more than one million Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire began fighting with the Banyamulenge, Zaire's Tutsis, the latter forged an alliance with longtime Mobutu opponent Laurent Kabila that, with help from other African states, overthrew Mobutu, whose armed forces disintegrated as the rebels advanced.

Revolution

Revolution is the path away from sultanism that has received by far the most attention in comparative studies of sultanistic regimes.⁶⁹ These studies, however, have tended to focus exclusively on the revolutionary cases of Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, Batista in Cuba, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran to show that sultanistic regimes are more likely than other types of nondemocratic

regimes to be overthrown by revolutionaries. Consequently, the structural features of sultanistic regimes that many of these studies identify as causes of revolution—overdependence on a superpower patron and political exclusion of domestic elites—do not differentiate sultanistic regimes toppled by revolutionaries from those such as Marcos's and Jean-Claude Duvalier's that were not (see table 3.1).⁷⁰ Their omission of nonrevolutionary cases of sultanism has led these analyses to understate the critical role that variations in the ruler's relationship with the military play in differentiating revolutionary from nonrevolutionary cases. As the analysis of nonrevolutionary paths out of sultanism in subsequent sections reveals, the absence of military autonomy is an additional structural cause that seems necessary for revolutionary collapse of sultanistic regimes.

In this section I review the structural factors that are necessary, but not sufficient, causes of the overthrow of sultanistic regimes by revolutionaries. I emphasize that a satisfactory account of revolutionary paths out of sultanism should look beyond these structural factors to consider maximalists' efforts and abilities to take advantage of structural opportunities for revolution.

Structural Causes of Revolution in Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba

The regimes of the Shah, Somoza, and Batista were all characterized by thorough penetration of state institutions by the dictators' patronage networks. The resulting fusion of the ruling clique with the state left little political space within which soft-line opposition could develop and stripped the military of its capacity for autonomous action. The undermining of the military's autonomy by the dictator's patronage network also eroded its overall competence and organizational coherence, making it vulnerable to disintegration when challenged in combat.

The nature of the ruler-state relationship thus had the effect of collapsing these three regimes into unitary, hard-line actors, minimizing the possibility that the impetus for political transformation could come "from above," from within the regime itself. According to Midlarsky and Roberts, this absence of potential soft-line allies may have meant that moderate opponents had no choice but to join revolutionary forces that had the military capacity to unseat the dictator and his subservient army.⁷¹

In terms of ruler-society relations, the regimes of Somoza, Batista, and the Shah were all characterized during their final years by the narrowness of the dictator's patronage circle and the shallowness of its penetration into civil society. This exclusion of domestic elites from patronage and power opened space within society for the growth of moderate and maximalist oppositions.

Finally, all three dictators were heavily dependent on U.S. support. The

external military and economic resources these rulers received from the United States allowed them to dispense with domestic coalition building, which encouraged the decoupling of these regimes from their societies and the exclusion of domestic elites from patronage. Their extreme dependence on the United States also stimulated opposition by frustrating the nationalist sentiments of domestic elites. And when powerful maximalist opposition groups challenged these regimes, the United States' insistence on liberalizing reforms and limited use of coercion restricted the rulers' margins of maneuver and undermined their confidence and control.

Based on these three cases, then, the sultanistic regimes most vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow share the following structural features: extensive penetration of the state by the dictator's patronage network, which undermines military autonomy; minimal extension of patronage into civil society; and extreme dependence on one superpower patron.⁷² Although these features help pinpoint which sultanistic regimes are structurally most susceptible to revolutionary overthrow, they are not by themselves sufficient causes of revolution. In addition, a revolutionary movement must take advantage of these structural opportunities by organizing against the regime, succeed in ousting the dictator, and then seize state power.

The Limits of Structural Explanations: Zaire

The case of Zaire buttresses the claim that structural variables cannot by themselves predict that a sultanistic regime will fall to revolutionaries. The domestic structural factors that contributed to revolutionary collapse in Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba (the fusion of ruler and state and shallow patronage penetration into civil society) were also present in Zaire since at least 1991.⁷³ Yet until 1997 no maximalist organizations remained marginal and weak, and failed to take advantage of this "revolutionary situation."

The weakness of maximalists in Zaire may have been a partial consequence of ongoing state repression or lingering fragmentation of civil society caused by Mobutu's patronage network. However, after 1990 Zairian moderates were partially able to overcome these same impediments, suggesting that other factors are needed to account for the absence of maximalists until 1997. One important factor may have been the failure of Zairian maximalists to use what Foran calls "political cultures of opposition" as bases for building revolutionary ideologies and movements.⁷⁴ By contrast, maximalists effectively tapped into the "cultural idioms" of nationalism in Nicaragua and Cuba and Shi'ite Islam in Iran to forge powerful revolutionary ideologies that helped them mobilize support.⁷⁵ The global exhaustion of Marxist-Leninist ideologies, which revolutionaries had

successfully combined with nationalism in several of Zaire's neighbors (e.g., Angola and Mozambique) during the 1970s, may have posed an additional impediment to the organization of maximalist opposition in contemporary Zaire. Had the structural vulnerabilities of Mobutu's regime developed a decade or two earlier, when the wave of Afrocommunism was sweeping the continent, Zairian maximalists might have been able to join their Angolan and Mozambican counterparts as leaders of revolutionary African Marxist states instead of coming to power twenty years later with the help of foreign troops.⁷⁶

In their quest to incorporate human agency alongside state and social structures in explaining revolutionary change, students of revolution have recently reexamined the cases of Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba to highlight the role of political action in the creation and consolidation of maximalist movements.⁷⁷ In addition to emphasizing the structural space for such movements created by exclusionary sultanistic regimes, these analyses identify the crafting of revolutionary ideologies by leaders who took advantage of political cultures of opposition as a necessary cause of revolution.

Such efforts to highlight the building of revolutionary ideologies and movements are important reminders that the negative "stimulus" of an exclusionary sultanistic regime does not automatically lead to the "response" of broad-based revolutionary mobilization. Although the catalyzing effects on opposition coalition building produced by common enmity toward a sultanistic ruler were clearly important in the revolutionary cases, the efforts of maximalist leaders to build and sustain these movements should not be overlooked.

Rather than focusing strictly on political action "from below" (the role of human agency in the creation of revolutionary oppositions), students of revolution seeking to integrate agency and structure might also benefit by widening their focus to include action "from above" (the role the choices of regime incumbents play in bringing down "their" regimes).⁷⁸ The literature on regime transitions could offer useful insights for investigating whether incumbent elites' strategies of rule, leadership, and decisions during moments of crises promote or impede revolution.

Military Dictatorship

Cases in which the breakdown of sultanism results in military rule are typically characterized by limited penetration of the state by the dictator's patronage network, which opens space for soft-line opposition within the state, especially by the military. The decisions of military soft-liners to take advantage of their autonomy and act against the dictator are often motivated by factors

external to the ruler-military relationship, such as pressures from mass uprisings against the dictator or encouragement by foreign powers. In cases of transition to military rule, moderates and maximalists are often weak and disorganized, allowing soft-line military factions who succeed in ousting the dictator to seize control of the state without contest (at least in the short term).

The February 1989 ouster of Alfredo Stroessner by the Paraguayan military fits this pattern. Although Stroessner's regime had strong sultanistic tendencies, it was not strictly sultanistic because of the central role played by the Colorado Party, which functioned during his rule as a relatively institutionalized mass patronage machine.⁷⁹ The overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986 better exemplifies this path out of sultanism.

Haiti: Jean-Claude Duvalier

Haiti saw two quite different transitions from the sultanistic rule of the Duvaliers: first a peaceful transfer of power from father to son in 1971 (see above) followed by a fifteen-year continuation of the dynasty, and then the replacement of sultanism by military dictatorship in 1986.⁸⁰ The breakdown of sultanism at the end of the younger Duvalier's rule after more than twenty years of stability was a consequence of changes in the ruler-state, ruler-society, and ruler-superpower relationships that encouraged societal elites to withdraw support for Duvalier and opened space within the state for organization of a soft-line opposition. This breakdown led to military dictatorship because soft-line factions of the armed forces turned against Duvalier and were able to fill the political vacuum left by his flight into exile. No coherent maximalist or moderate oppositions existed at that time that could challenge the military's seizure of power, despite the highly exclusionary character of Jean-Claude's regime.

After marrying into an affluent mulatto family in 1980, the younger Duvalier began to exclude from his patronage circle the black elites who traditionally had been the regime's core base of support. Instead, Jean-Claude favored the mulatto commercial elites, who demanded greater patronage rewards in exchange for support and whose ties to the rest of Haitian society were more limited than those of their black middle-class predecessors. As a result, the extensive patronage network constructed by François Duvalier unraveled, dissolving the key ruler-society links that had enabled the Duvalier regime to penetrate and control civil society.⁸¹

Significantly, Jean-Claude's exclusion of the black elite did *not* lead to the formation of a coherent opposition. Twenty-five years of Duvalierism had stifled both maximalists and moderates; potential opposition leaders had been either exiled, killed, or co-opted. Because of this dual legacy of repression and

co-optation, Haitian moderates lacked the leadership and organization to challenge the dictator. Would-be revolutionaries were perhaps even less able to challenge Duvalier than were moderates. Haitian maximalists had never established a large base of popular support and had not recovered from a series of crushing defeats by the elder Duvalier's forces in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸² In Haiti, in contrast to Nicaragua, Cuba, and Iran, no viable revolutionary organizations existed that could take advantage of the weakness of moderates and pull them into broad coalitions against the dictator. The legacies of co-optation and severe repression during François Duvalier's rule continued to pose insurmountable obstacles to the organization of moderate and maximalist oppositions to Jean-Claude. Thus, despite high levels of exclusion of black elites after 1980, both moderates and maximalists remained weak. As we shall see, the weakness of civilian opposition groups aided the military's seizure and monopolization of power in 1986.

By shifting the basis of his support to the mulatto elite, Jean-Claude loosened his grip on the countryside and also increased his dependence on foreign aid. The loyalty of the mulatto elite was contingent on the state's ensuring them a high standard of living, and foreign aid, primarily from the United States, was Duvalier's main source of funds to meet the high price of his new constituency's support.⁸³ Jean-Claude actively sought U.S. assistance to fuel his patronage network and, in doing so, eroded the autonomy from foreign powers his father had enjoyed.

A group of Haitian army officers had disapproved of the younger Duvalier from the beginning of his rule.⁸⁴ According to Abbott, as popular pressure mounted against him after 1984 (see below), these officers, led by army chief of staff Henri Namphy, "began sounding out fellow officers, so that a core of key men could be counted on to assist in a bloodless ouster and not take up arms in final defense of the President."⁸⁵ The military conspirators found a fertile field of recruits in the ranks of former officers dismissed by Jean-Claude; an important part of their strategy was to have these officers reinstated. The ability of these malcontents to communicate and to plot a coup without Duvalier's knowledge reflects the transformation of the ruler-state relationship under Jean-Claude's rule: the closing of political space for organization of soft-line opposition during the elder Duvalier's rule had been reversed. The military was now poised to reassert its traditional role as arbiter of national politics. It was able to exercise its regained autonomy and to seize power when spontaneous mass protests and pressure from the United States forced Duvalier to relinquish state control.

The unraveling of Jean-Claude Duvalier's patronage ties to the black elite,

his dependence on U.S. aid, and his loosened grip on the military were structural factors that weakened his regime. However, these structural factors do not by themselves explain his overthrow. The sultanistic regime did not collapse under its own weight; a combination of internal and external actors gave a crucial push.

Continuing economic crisis sparked a series of spontaneous and church-catalyzed popular uprisings between 1984 and 1986. The Duvalier regime's ability to contain this growing unrest was diminished by the weakening of its capacity to penetrate and control civil society, resulting, as I noted above, from the disintegration of the black middle-class patronage network. The Catholic Church (especially local priests and activists called the *ti legliz*, or "little church," to distinguish them from the more conservative hierarchy)⁸⁶, which had recovered from crippling confrontations with the elder Duvalier in the 1960s, was galvanized by the pope's 1983 visit to Haiti and emerged as a potent center of opposition, organizing and channeling popular discontent.⁸⁷

As these internal pressures against Duvalier increased, the United States used its leverage to push him out of office and clear the way for the military soft-liners, with whom it had been secretly negotiating, to seize power.⁸⁸ On 29 January 1986 the United States announced it was withholding \$26 million in scheduled aid to protest Duvalier's brutal response to the wave of mass protests. This move was tantamount to a public withdrawal of U.S. support. The United States encouraged the military conspirators by promising concessions to those who assisted in the dictator's removal. General Namphy and his fellow conspirators used this U.S. guarantee as a bargaining chip to persuade the leaders of the Tonton Macoutes to abandon Jean-Claude. On 6 February Duvalier boarded a U.S. Air Force C-141 headed for France. In Haiti, the United States was able to find and support an acceptable replacement for the dictator and to "manage" the transition by pressuring its dependent patron out of office, thereby defusing mass mobilization against him.

The absence of both moderate and maximalist political organizations and the Macoutes' disarray after Duvalier's flight allowed the military to seize power unchallenged. It was the only force able to fill the political vacuum left in Duvalier's wake. The United States' initial willingness to support the fledgling military government by sending arms and aid helped solidify the armed forces' control.⁸⁹

After Duvalier's ouster, the military presided over five years of political chaos during which a series of short-lived military or de facto regimes attempted to govern and one election was aborted by a polling-place massacre.⁹⁰ Democratic opposition groups remained weak and disorganized. In 1990, in response to

international pressure, the military elite decided to tolerate fair elections. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest whose support was based mainly in grassroots church and neighborhood organizations, won by a landslide, and in February 1991 he became the first freely elected president in Haiti's history.

Although Aristide's relations with the military were initially positive, they soon deteriorated. Aristide demoted and replaced many officers, made plans for a new civilian police force, and proposed a European-trained presidential guard—all of which created resentment and fear within the armed forces. Aristide's passionate commitment to liberation theology and his populist rhetoric also alienated the economic elite. With the blessing of many members of this elite, the military ousted Aristide on 30 September 1991.⁹¹

The continued domination of the political arena by the military and the weakness of democratic forces can both be understood as legacies of Haiti's sultanistic *and* presultanistic periods. As I noted above, the Duvaliers' long rule fragmented civil society and reinforced preexisting patterns of inequality and clientelism. However, the roots of current instability and authoritarianism reach back into Haitian history long before the Duvaliers. The military dominated Haitian politics before François Duvalier's rise to power. Hence its re-emergence at the center of the political arena after Jean-Claude's overthrow can be viewed as a revival of historical political patterns after a "sultanistic interlude." Although the Duvalier dynasty certainly reinforced antidemocratic structures and traditions, it did not create them. On the contrary, these preexisting structures probably should themselves be regarded as *causes* that explain the dynasty's origins.⁹² The advantages for analysis of situating sultanistic regimes in long-term trajectories of national political development will be discussed in the chapter's conclusion.

Civilian Rule

Cases in which transitions from sultanism lead directly to nonrevolutionary civilian rule are typically characterized by shallow penetration of the dictator's patronage network into state *and* civil society, creating structural space for the organization of opposition in both arenas.⁹³ In such cases power is transferred either to moderate opposition groups or to civilian soft-liners, usually after a revolt against the dictator by military soft-liners. A central puzzle posed by cases of direct transition from sultanism to civilian rule concerns why power is transferred to civilians rather than seized by the mutinous military soft-liners as occurred in Haiti.

This path out of sultanism is exemplified by the cases of Marcos in the

Philippines, where power was transferred to the moderate opposition, and of Ceaușescu in Romania, where power was transferred to civilian regime soft-liners. The cases of Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948–58) in Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo (1930–61) in the Dominican Republic,⁹⁴ although not analyzed here, are also examples of nonrevolutionary transitions from sultanism to civilian rule.⁹⁵

The Philippines: Transition to Elite Democracy

The transition from Marcos's regime in the Philippines is the only case examined here in which the full complement of hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, and maximalists was present. As one might expect, the role of contingency and strategic interaction appears to have been especially important in this four-player transition. The presence of military soft-liners and a powerful revolutionary opposition alongside the moderate opposition raises the question, Why was power transferred to moderates and not to one of the two armed groups?⁹⁶

Marcos's regime, like the revolutionary cases, was characterized by exclusion of traditional elites, which encouraged growth of both maximalist and moderate oppositions, and by extreme dependence on U.S. support. Despite these similarities, however, revolution did not occur, because there existed pockets of intrastate autonomy within which military soft-liners organized. Instead, the breakdown of sultanism in the Philippines led to a transition to civilian rule because a powerful moderate opposition was able to eschew alliance with maximalists and take power with the help of military soft-liners who revolted against the dictator.

In 1986, approximately 1,500 of the military's 13,500 officers were members of the Reform the Armed Forces Now Movement (RAM), which had been formed with U.S. support in 1985 by officers disturbed by the influx of Marcos's patronage appointees.⁹⁷ On 22 February 1986, in the context of widespread public outrage over Marcos's use of violence and fraud during presidential elections held earlier that month, a group of officers affiliated with the RAM launched a coup against the dictator. Although the coup itself failed, it was supported by tens of thousands of civilians, mobilized by the Catholic Church, who formed a human buffer to protect the mutinous officers. This outpouring of "people power" led to a wave of military defections and to Marcos's departure three days later.⁹⁸

The military revolt allowed the Philippine moderates (who had coalesced into a powerful movement with broad popular support behind the leadership of Corazon Aquino and the Catholic Church)⁹⁹ to eschew alliance with the maximalist National Democratic Front (NDF).¹⁰⁰ Had the military not revolted, the Philippine moderates, like their Iranian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban

counterparts, would probably have had little choice but to ally with the maximalists, who were accumulating the coercive resources needed to dislodge Marcos. In the Philippines, the key structural factors that push moderates into alliance with maximalists were absent: an exclusionary sultanistic regime in which the military's capacity for autonomous action has been undermined. The coup against Marcos allowed the moderates to replace him without opening the way to a seizure of power by the revolutionary opposition.

In the Philippines, in contrast to Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba, the dictator's extreme dependence on U.S. support inhibited revolution. The Aquino-led moderate opposition and the military soft-liners (the RAM) were acceptable to the United States as replacements to Marcos. More important, the Aquino coalition was a *viable* successor to Marcos because of its organizational coherence and broad popular support. The presence of an acceptable and viable civilian alternative enabled the United States to influence the transition in the Philippines by using its leverage over Marcos to usher him out of power and to ease in the moderates. When the army officers affiliated with the RAM launched their coup at the end of February 1986, the United States gave them fuel and ammunition and threatened to cut off Marcos's military aid if his troops attacked the rebels.¹⁰¹ President Ronald Reagan offered Marcos asylum, an offer the besieged dictator accepted after consulting U.S. senator Paul Laxalt. Laxalt advised Marcos, "Cut and cut cleanly. The time has come."¹⁰² Hours later U.S. helicopters ferried Marcos into exile. By pressuring Marcos out of power, the United States helped clear the way for the moderate Aquino coalition, backed by the church and the mass mobilization of people's power, to take control. Thus U.S. policy worked to keep state power beyond the maximalist NDF's reach.

We have seen how the combination of a potent moderate opposition, a mutinous military, and U.S. pressure inhibited revolution in the Philippines in 1986. A second question must also be addressed: Why didn't the Philippine military seize power for itself, "Haitian-style," and block the civilian moderates? The Philippines are unique among the cases of sultanism discussed here in terms of the moderate opposition's levels of organizational coherence and popular support.¹⁰³ Challenging the broad-based, popular Aquino coalition would have been difficult for the Philippine armed forces in 1986, especially given the factionalism within its ranks and its low popular legitimacy stemming from its abusiveness during Marcos's rule.¹⁰⁴ As for the small band of about three hundred officers that launched the 22 February coup, they surely would have been crushed without the protection of the legions of civilians summoned to their aid by the church. The military defectors were dependent on civilian support,

which Aquino commanded more than anyone else. For these reasons the military, having chosen to withdraw its support from Marcos, had few options but to support Aquino, at least temporarily.¹⁰⁵

Significantly, the option of withdrawing support from Marcos was palatable to the military defectors precisely because there existed a viable, moderate civilian alternative to the dictator. Had a group unacceptable to the military, such as the maximalist NDF, dominated the civilian opposition, the RAM officers might well have postponed their coup plans until they felt capable of seizing power on their own, without civilian assistance. Alternatively, they might not have attempted to remove Marcos at all, preferring the deleterious effects on the military of a sultanistic dictator to those of a leftist government. The presence of the moderate Aquino coalition allowed the military soft-liners to turn against Marcos, secure that, if the armed forces did not take power, an acceptable civilian group would.

Romania: The Resurrection of "Presultanistic" State Institutions

The transition from Ceaușescu's regime in Romania in 1989 involved a smaller cast of actors than did the transition in the Philippines. In Romania, soft-liners, with civilian and military components, and hard-liners were the only well-organized groups during the transition. And in contrast to the Philippines, the civilian regime that succeeded the sultanistic dictator had strong authoritarian tendencies and was composed of individuals with close ties to the old regime.¹⁰⁶

Ceaușescu's rule, which Linden aptly labels "socialist patrimonialism," was based on a three-way balance between the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), the army, and the secret police (Securitate).¹⁰⁷ Ceaușescu skillfully played these three institutions off against one another. This system of manipulated "checks and balances" combined with Ceaușescu's direct measures to undermine each institution's autonomy was the basis for his regime's stability until the late 1980s.¹⁰⁸

Although Ceaușescu was able to use the RCP, the army, and the Securitate as counterweights to one another for many years, his ruling clique appears to have penetrated and transformed state institutions to a lesser degree than did those of the Shah, Mobutu, or the Somozas. In contrast to these cases, Ceaușescu's sultanistic regime was superimposed on a *preexisting* party-state apparatus. One of the most striking features of the Romanian case is the resilience of state institutions with pre-Ceaușescu roots: the Communist Party, the state administrative bureaucracy (which was closely intertwined with the RCP), and the military all emerged relatively intact after Ceaușescu's ouster. This institutional

resilience and the central roles in Ceaușescu's overthrow played by military and RCP soft-liners indicate that his regime sat lightly upon the state compared with other sultanistic regimes.

By the end of 1989, Ceaușescu had alienated the armed forces, the RCP, and the international community, and his rule rested precariously on the terror created by the Securitate.¹⁰⁹ A wave of spontaneous mass protests, which began in the city of Timișoara on 17 December 1989 and soon swept the country, created an opportunity for army and party soft-liners to throw off the sultanistic ruling clique that had ridden piggyback on their institutions for two decades. The clash of soft-liners and hard-liners took the form of pitched battles between disloyal and loyal security forces (mainly Securitate members), which lasted until Ceaușescu's capture on 23 December by military rebels and his execution several days later. The absence of well-organized moderate or maximalist opposition groups enabled the National Salvation Front (FSN), a civilian-led coalition with close ties to both the Communist Party and the military, to take control without contest.¹¹⁰

Ceaușescu's ouster is similar in many ways to Jean-Claude Duvalier's overthrow in Haiti. In both cases organized societal opposition groups were absent during the transition, and spontaneous mass protests played central roles triggering and pushing forward the dictator's overthrow. In both Haiti and Romania, revolts by soft-liners in the regular armed forces led to the ouster of the dictators and their personal, paramilitary guards—Duvalier's *Tonton Macoutes* and Ceaușescu's Securitate.¹¹¹ The weakness of democratic groups in both cases cleared the way for transfers of power to successor regimes in which members of the former elite played a central role.¹¹²

Beyond Transitions from Sultanism

The time frames of the case analyses in this chapter are limited to the periods encompassing sultanistic rule, its breakdown, and the transition to a regime type distinct from sultanism. This time frame is adequate for explaining *short-term* outcomes. As the number of "postsultanistic" regimes grows, however, it is increasingly important to develop analytic frameworks for understanding political dynamics after sultanism. The revival of presultanistic political practices, social structures, and state institutions in Romania, Haiti, and the Philippines suggests that the key to understanding postsultanistic patterns of political development may often be found in historical events antecedent to the sultanistic episode. To comprehend political dynamics after sultanism, then, it may be fruitful to situate sultanistic regimes in long-term trajectories of national politi-

cal development in order to capture foundational, presultanistic events whose resilient legacies may influence patterns of development after sultanistic episodes. Thus, paradoxically, expanding our time frame forward into the postsultanistic period may simultaneously require us to stretch it backward into the periods preceding the rise of sultanism.¹¹³

The historical continuities that appear especially salient for understanding political dynamics after sultanistic regimes (weak domestic classes, fragmented civil societies, "soft" state institutions, and "crises of sovereignty" associated with external intervention) may themselves have played significant roles in the origins of these very regimes. Such factors, which are constant across the presultanistic, sultanistic, and postsultanistic periods in many of the cases analyzed here, may help explain how one man was able to consolidate so much power during a specific historical juncture and shift his country temporarily onto a sultanistic path of development.

Although historical structures and practices antecedent to the sultanistic regime may be important for understanding postsultanistic political dynamics, we should not assume that the sultanistic episode itself has no autonomous influence on subsequent political trajectories. The impact of the sultanistic period on future patterns of political change is especially transparent in those cases where the dictator's style of rule and the structure of his regime led to the organization of revolutionary movements and promoted their seizure of state power. In each case, we need to investigate empirically how far the sultanistic episode eroded or reinforced antecedent political practices and structures.¹¹⁴

In addition to accounting for the varied dynamics of sultanistic regimes, a central objective of this chapter has been to show how broad programmatic guidelines for linking human agency and social structures in explaining regime change can be translated into concrete research strategies. The category of sultanistic regimes offers unusual leverage for developing such strategies because it lies at the intersection of a literature that has so clearly emphasized structural explanations (the literature on contemporary revolutions) with one that has so clearly emphasized voluntarist explanations (the literature on regime transitions). I have attempted to use this intersection as a basis for developing an integrative explanatory framework sensitive to the causal roles of both human agency and social structure in the transformation of political regimes.

Several lessons can be drawn from this analysis for those interested in constructing such integrative frameworks. First, this analysis suggests the utility of regime typologies and categories that expose the structural logics of regimes by isolating "critical relationships" linking actors within a regime to each other

and to outside actors, both domestic and international. Such regime categories make it easier to map the structural contexts of regime transitions and can thus help us specify the margins of maneuverability available to actors. In the analysis above of transitions from sultanism, for example, conceptualizing sultanistic regimes in terms of three critical patronage relationships—the relationship of the ruler to state institutions, the relationship of the ruler to societal elites, and the relationship of foreign powers to domestic actors—was an effective means of specifying the varied structural contexts of such transitions. This analysis also indicates the utility of conceptual tools that disaggregate regimes and societies, enabling us to probe dynamics of conflict and coalition between multiple actors. The conceptual distinction between ruler and state, for example, proved especially helpful because it enabled us to differentiate cases where transitions from “above” were structurally possible (cases in which segments of the armed forces were autonomous from the ruler) from those where the impetus for political change could come only from “below” (from outside the regime). The distinction between government and state might offer similar explanatory leverage in cases that are not sultanistic.¹¹⁵

Second, this analysis suggests the importance of the comparative method for combining structural and voluntarist perspectives. Case studies, especially those confined to short periods, are ill suited for joining human agency and social structure in the explanation of regime change because they must rely on counterfactuals to assess the causal role of each. For example, in his case study of the breakdown of democracy in Brazil in 1964, Alfred Stepan argues that socioeconomic and institutional constraints were necessary but not sufficient causes of regime breakdown because they left a small margin of maneuverability within which incumbents’ political strategies could have averted regime collapse.¹¹⁶ Stepan’s claim for such a margin of maneuverability is grounded in the counterfactual argument that regime breakdown would not have occurred if the incumbent president, João Goulart, had acted differently.¹¹⁷ This claim would have been significantly more plausible had Stepan analyzed a *factual* case where there were structural constraints similar to those in Brazil in 1964, yet regime breakdown did *not* occur because of differences in incumbents’ actions. His single case study method did not afford this opportunity.

By contrast, the analysis presented above uses comparisons of varied structural contexts of transitions from sultanism, rather than counterfactuals, to gauge the latitude for actor discretion during processes of regime change and to justify claims that in some cases actors’ contingent political strategies had an important influence on the dynamics and outcomes of these processes. In cases where *similar* structural contexts led to *different* outcomes, as in Haiti under

Jean-Claude Duvalier and the Philippines under Marcos, and where *different* structural contexts led to *similar* outcomes, as in Nicaragua under Somoza García and Haiti under François Duvalier, we have a strong basis for inferring that structural factors by themselves were not sufficient causes of regime outcomes.¹¹⁸ The comparative method enables us to ground such inferences in empirical regularities rather than in counterfactuals. Using the comparative method to map and juxtapose varied structural contexts of transitions should prove an indispensable tool for scholars seeking to build integrative frameworks for explaining regime change.

Finally, the integrative approach developed here, which combines structural and voluntarist perspectives by using cross-sectional mappings of the varied structural contexts of transitions, is especially suited for analyzing *short-term* outcomes of regime change. Scholars interested in exploring longer-term processes of regime change, such as political trajectories encompassing presultanistic, sultanistic, and postsultanistic periods, will need integrative frameworks that combine an appreciation for the long-term, persistent effects of past events with a sensitivity to the inherent dynamism of human agency. Path-dependent research strategies, especially those that emphasize “critical junctures,” may offer fruitful tools for linking past constraints to subsequent regime outcomes in ways that highlight how these constraints were created, reproduced, and eventually transformed by human action.¹¹⁹ Integrative path-dependent frameworks will need to balance the goal of capturing and accounting for continuing effects of past constraints against allowing room for actors to play autonomous causal roles in regime change. In other words, they will need to overcome the tendency, exemplified by the structuralist works of Barrington Moore and Gregory Luebbert, to treat the developmental path linking historical junctures and subsequent regime change as the “deliverer of the inevitable.”¹²⁰ They will also need to overcome the tendency to treat events during historical junctures as themselves predetermined by antecedent structural factors. Rather, the creation of structures and institutions during such junctures must be characterized by choice and contingency.

Addressing issues such as these will help scholars solve the difficult problem of combining social structure and human agency in explaining regime change.

The election does prove that the Islamic Republic is not sultanistic, however, since most Iranian officials supported the losing candidate.

91. See Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolutions and Superpowers," in *Superpowers and Revolutions*, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (New York: Praeger, 1986).
92. James Clad, "Still in the Family," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 March 1987, 70.
93. See, for instance, Henry F. Carey, "Irregularities or Rigging: Romania's 1992 Parliamentary Elections," *East European Quarterly* 29 (spring 1995). For an analysis see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, chap. 18. One might even go back further and ask whether the corruption and institutional decay of the Ceaușescu years were not to some extent a legacy of the sultanistic rule of King Carol (r. 1930–40), under whom "administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor" and "public ethics hit a new low." Roberts, *Rumania*, 208. Mattei Dogan calls Romania's interwar period "mimic democracy." See his "Romania 1919–1938," in *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, ed. Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987).
94. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1112.
95. Raimund Krämer, "Der alte Mann und die Insel," *Berliner Debatte* 2 (1993).
96. See Asghar Schirazi, *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).
97. For a suggestive account of how postrevolutionary Nicaragua's politics were affected by the sultanist heritage see Arturo Cruz Jr., "The Absurdity of Nicaragua," *New Republic*, 16 November 1987, 26–36.
98. It is interesting that whereas Castro and Khomeini were both allowed to go into exile after their first challenge to Batista and the Shah (the Moncada Barracks incident in 1953 and the uprising of 1963), they dealt far more harshly with Batista's and the Shah's supporters when they came to power in 1959 and 1979.
99. Mass emigration of mostly middle-class Cubans and Iranians has further diminished the prospects of democratization.
100. Although in Zaire some of the de facto autonomous provinces seem to have been more competently governed than they were under Mobutu. See Howard W. French, "A Neglected Region Loosens Ties to Zaire," *New York Times*, 18 September 1996.
101. John Thayer Sidel, "Beyond Patron-Client Relations: Warlordism and Local Politics in the Philippines," *Kasarinlan* 4, no. 3 (1989): 26–28.
102. Guillermo Donnell, "The State and Democratization," *World Development* 21 (1993): 1358.
103. On the importance of local politics see Joel S. Migdal, "The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles of Domination," in *State Power and Social Force: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
104. See *Wall Street Journal* (Europe), 29–30 November 1996.

3 • Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes

Portions of the analyses of Haiti, Zaire, and the Philippines are adapted from my article "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 4 (1992): 379–99. The integrative explanatory framework introduced in this

chapter also draws in part on structural variables employed in the earlier work. I thank H. E. Chehabi, David Collier, Ruth Berins Collier, John Foran, Jeff Goodwin, Juan Linz, and James Mahoney for their helpful comments and suggestions. This material is based on work supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.

1. See Robert H. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," *Polity* 16 (1983): 423–46; Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolutions and Superpowers," in *Superpowers and Revolutions*, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (New York: Praeger, 1986), 38–48; Manus I. Midlarsky and Kenneth Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution in Central America: Nicaragua and El Salvador Compared," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29, no. 2 (1985): 163–93; Farideh Farhi, "State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 2 (1988): 231–56; Farideh Farhi, *States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (1989): 489–509; Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, "Understanding Failed Revolution in El Salvador: A Comparative Analysis of Regime Types and Social Structures," *Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (1989), 511–37; and John Foran, "A Theory of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua and El Salvador Compared," *Critical Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1993): 3–27. On the outcomes of revolutions against sultanistic rulers see John Foran and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition Fragmentation, War, and the Limits of Social Transformation," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 209–47.

2. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), esp. chap. 3; Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. chap. 8; and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 32–33. The concept of "waves" of democratization is from Huntington.

3. I refer here to structural explanations of revolution by scholars such as Theda Skocpol, Jeffrey Paige, and Charles Tilly that constitute what Goldstone calls the "third generation" of theories of revolution and also to subsequent research, mainly from the 1980s, that "deepened" this generation. See Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32, no. 3 (1980): 425–53. On the deepening of this generation during the 1980s, see the essay by John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?" *Sociological Theory* 13, no. 1 (1993): 1–20.

4. The most widely cited work on transitions from authoritarianism exemplifying such a voluntarist approach is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: prospects for Democracy*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See especially O'Donnell and Schmitter's theoretical volume, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); Enrique Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transitions and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987). Note that the voluntarism of many of these works was a reaction against earlier deterministic explanations of regime change that focused on "precondi-

tions" for democracy. For a critique of the preconditions approach see Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990): 1–21; esp. 2–5.

5. Foran notes that a focus on the role of human agency is a key feature of the emerging "fourth generation" of theories of revolution. See Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited," 6–8. For efforts to "bring agency back in" see, in addition to Foran, William H. Sewell Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," *Journal of Modern History* 57, no. 1 (1985), 57–85; Michael S. Kimmel, *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); James Mahoney, "Social Structure and Political Culture in the Explanation of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran and Cuba Compared," unpublished MS, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1992; and Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993).

6. Karl and Schmitter use the rubric "from contingent choice to structured contingency" to describe this integrative agenda. See Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 128 (May 1991): 270–71. For a discussion of alternative strategies for integrating agency and structure in the analysis of regime change and the difficult conceptual challenges confronting the would-be integrator, see James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, "Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change," in *The Challenges of Theories on Democracy*, ed. Sten Ugelvik Larsen, Social Science Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).

Critiques of the extreme voluntarism of the transitions literature that emphasize the need to combine agency and structure in the explanation of regime change include Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy," *World Politics* 40, no. 3 (1988): 377–94; Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," *Comparative Politics* 22, no. 3 (1990): 359–77; Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America"; Karen L. Remmer, "New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The Study of Latin American Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (1991): 479–95; Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?" *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 4 (1992): 1028–34; and Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 26 (April 1994): 355–75.

7. Impressionistic evidence suggests that the study of contemporary revolutions has been undertaken predominantly by sociologists, while the study of regime transitions has been undertaken predominantly by political scientists.

8. Other analyses that self-consciously seek to combine elements of these two literatures are Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (1990): 422–40, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Guerillas and Elections: An Institutional Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and Competition," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 121–52.

9. Although Romania had elements of a staged revolution.

10. Some of the cases I analyze here, such as Zaire under Mobutu (before 1991) and Haiti under François Duvalier, are not strictly sultanistic because the ruler's circle of clients extended beyond a narrow clique of cronies. In an earlier analysis I used the term "neopatrimonial" to refer to the set of regimes discussed here. See Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," *Comparative Politics* 24,

no. 4 (1992): 379–99. On the concept of neopatrimonialism see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations* (New York: Free Press, 1978), 277–89. For an application of the concept to the African context, see Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," *World Politics* 46 (July 1994): 374–75. On patrimonial rule more generally, see Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics* 20 (1968): 194–206, and Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).

11. This approach to the definition of actors draws on Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions to Democracy: Some Navigation Instruments," in *Democracy in the Americas*, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), 62–75; and O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions*, 4–5, 15–17. I have also benefited from the discussions of theoretical issues involved in the definitions of actors in Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 47–63, and in David Collier and Deborah L. Norden, "Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 2 (1992): 229–43. According to Przeworski (53–54), defining actors in terms of strategic postures is risky because "strategic postures may remain the same but the particular groups or individuals that hold them may change," hence, there is a temptation to look to institutional and structural roles to explain why these shifts occurred. I would note the additional risk of creating an ontological dualism that isolates agents from structures, stripping actors from their social moorings and treating them in an "undersocialized" fashion. On undersocialized conceptions of human agency see Mahoney and Snyder, "Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change."

12. This effort to specify the "margins of maneuverability" for actor discretion allowed by structural factors resembles in some respects Alfred Stepan's analysis of the collapse of democracy in Brazil in 1964. See Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 110–37. However, in contrast to Stepan's analysis, which relies on a single case study, this analysis compares multiple cases to gauge the latitude for actor discretion during transitions. The implications of this difference are discussed in the chapter's conclusion. For an analysis of Stepan's "funnel" strategy for integrating agency and structure in the explanation of regime change, see Mahoney and Snyder, "Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change."

A more fully integrative approach than the one employed here would not be limited to "mapping" structural contexts but would also emphasize how these structures were created, reproduced, and eventually transformed by human agents.

13. These labels and the discussion that follows are adapted from O'Donnell, "Transitions to Democracy," 64–68, and O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions*, 15–17. O'Donnell and Schmitter emphasize that these four groups are themselves usually composed of several factions. This analytic scheme also corresponds to Huntington's fourfold typology of "standpatters," "reformers," "moderates," and "extremists" in *Third Wave*, 122.

14. Soft-liners are not necessarily reformists or democrats; they can be as ruthless as dictators.
15. As O'Donnell points out, regime hard-liners and the maximalist opposition are "in effect allies in promoting a polarization that threatens to eliminate the soft-liners from important positions in the regime" and to undercut the position of moderates. O'Donnell, "Transitions to Democracy," 65.
16. On the fusion of public and private characteristic of sultanistic regimes, see Chehabi and Linz, chapter 1 of this volume.
17. The presence of hard-liners, however, can be assumed more safely than the presence of the other three groups, because the very definition of these regimes entails a ruling clique committed to retaining power.
18. Differentiating cases of "missed" structural opportunities (that is, failures to act) from cases where such opportunities did not exist poses formidable empirical and epistemological challenges. In both cases the "outcome" is usually the same: that predicted by structural factors. Close empirical scrutiny of cases to uncover evidence of intent (or its absence) may be the only remedy. The data requirements for demonstrating intent or its absence are often quite daunting for cases of regime change.
19. Of course repression is also an important, if not unique, feature of sultanistic regimes. See Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, *Macropolitical Theory*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 175–357. See esp. 259–60.
20. On the radial nature of patrimonial authority structures see Karen L. Remmer, "Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973–1987," *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 2 (1989): 149–70, esp. 165.
21. On the military in sultanistic regimes see Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chap. 6. On indicators for measuring military autonomy see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), and David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992): 83–102.
22. Joel S. Migdal aptly calls this imperative confronting personalistic rulers the "politics of survival." See his *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 6.
23. And hence can help avoid the reification of this structure. Reification refers to the loss of "the awareness that, however objectivated, the social world was made by men [and women]—and, therefore, can be remade by them." Quoted from Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 89.
24. Toward the end of his rule, Ceaușescu in Romania also moved in this direction, relying increasingly on the paramilitary Securitate as his support base and isolating the regular armed forces.
25. See Elizabeth Abbott, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 306–7.
26. On the important role of caretaker governments in transitions from nondemocratic regimes, see Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, "The Role of Interim Governments," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no. 1 (1992): 73–89.

27. Of course the existence of this political space does not automatically lead to the growth of moderate and maximalist opposition groups, since actors may neither be able nor choose to use this space to organize.
28. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," 436–38, 443–46; Goldstone, "Revolutions and Superpowers," 43–44; and Midlarsky and Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution in Central America," 185–90.
29. Midlarsky and Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution," 187.
30. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," 432–38.
31. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions," 498–501.
32. The term "political cultures of opposition" is from Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited," 13.
33. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 18. For a reconsideration of this position by Schmitter in light of the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, see Philippe C. Schmitter, "The International Context of Contemporary Democratization," *Stanford Journal of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (1993): 1–34.
34. Since the set of sultanistic regimes includes some of the most overtly "dependent" superpower client regimes, it is especially fertile ground for exploring the limits of superpower influence in the international system. See Robert A. Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U.S. Influence," *International Security* 15, no. 4 (1991): 54–86. Juxtaposing cases of sultanistic regimes characterized by extreme dependence on the United States alongside cases characterized by the absence of such dependence could be especially fruitful for testing the boundaries of superpower influence.
35. This does not mean that international conditions should be ignored in the analysis of other types of regimes.
36. Farhi, "State Disintegration," 241–45; Goldstone, "Revolutions and Superpowers," 44–47.
37. Direct intervention by a foreign power is well illustrated by the United States' invasion of Panama in 1989 to remove General Manuel Noriega. On the Panamanian case see Steve C. Ropp, "Explaining the Long-Term Maintenance of a Military Regime: Panama before the U.S. Invasion," *World Politics* 44, no. 2 (1992): 210–34.
38. Furthermore, the divergent regime outcomes in Romania (rule by civilian soft-liners) and Haiti (rule by military soft-liners) indicate that the relative strengths of oppositions cannot by themselves predict outcomes of transitions from sultanism.
39. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 3. As Karen Remmer points out, "Particularly telling is the contrast Huntington draws between the instability of the Stroessner regime and the stability of Chilean democracy (Huntington, p. 80), which collapsed only five years after the publication of his book." See Remmer, "Neopatrimonialism," 170.
40. David Nicholls, *Haiti in Caribbean Context: Ethnicity, Economy, and Revolt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 219.
41. The flight abroad of large segments of the Haitian middle class and professional class further drained the potential support base of moderate opposition groups. By 1980 approximately one million Haitians, or 14 percent of the country's potential population, had left the country. See James Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 67.

42. Abbott, *Haiti*, 86–88.
43. *Ibid.*, 85–87. For a historical analysis of the Haitian military, including the Duvalier period, see Michel S. Laguerre, *The Military and Society in Haiti* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1993).
44. Abbott, *Haiti*, 160–61, 301.
45. Quoted in Nicholls, *Haiti in Caribbean Context*, 229.
46. Georges Fauriol, "The Duvaliers and Haiti," *Orbis* 32 (1987): 587–607; see esp. 595–97.
47. Nicholls, *Haiti in Caribbean Context*, 223.
48. Thomas Turner, "Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" *Current History* 87 (1988): 213–16, 230; quotation at 215.
49. Michael G. Schatzberg, *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1988), 4.
50. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 28.
51. *Ibid.*, 161–62.
52. Turner, "Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" 216. Turner mentions the dissolution in 1987 of the domestically based opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Most of the UDPS leaders were absorbed into Mobutu's MPR, Zaire's only legal party at the time. As is discussed below, a revitalized UDPS appears to have emerged after 1991.
53. Quoted in Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 262.
54. *Ibid.*, 264.
55. Schatzberg, *Dialectics of Oppression*, 66.
56. Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 265–67.
57. *Ibid.*, 393–95; Kenneth B. Noble, "Pretoria Said to Advise Zairian Army," *New York Times*, 17 August 1991, 2.
58. Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 255–58.
59. Zaire has extensive mineral resources, including rich deposits of copper, tin, cobalt, iron ore, and diamonds. And Zaire's border with Angola made it strategically important to the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, when superpower proxies fought one another in the Angolan civil war.
60. Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 395.
61. Quoted in Turner, "Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" 213.
62. Kenneth B. Noble, "Hope for Change Fades in Zaire as Feuds Flare," *New York Times*, 14 August 1991, A5. On runaway inflation and Zaire's enormous debt see Kenneth B. Noble, "In Zaire, Fear and Despair Grow as Economy Slides into Chaos," *New York Times*, 4 November 1991, A4.
63. Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire's Dictator Agrees to Share Power with Foe," *New York Times*, 30 September 1991, A1, A6.
64. See "Mobutu Ousts Foe and Renews Chaos," *New York Times*, 21 October 1991, A5; "Riots Continuing over Ouster of Mobutu Foe," *New York Times*, 25 October 1991, A6.
65. René Lemarchand, "Africa's Troubled Transitions," *Journal of Democracy* 3 no. 4 (1992): 98–109, at 105.
66. See "Witnesses Say Police Killed Three People in Zaire Riot," *New York Times*, 4 September 1991, A5; "Troops in Zaire Capital Go on a Looting Spree," *New York Times*, 28

September 1991, 3; Kenneth B. Noble, "Anti-Mobutu Protests Set off Violence," *New York Times*, 11 October 1991, A3; "Soldiers Open Fire in Zaire, Killing 13," *New York Times*, 17 February 1992, A3.

67. See Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire's Chief Vows to Stay in Power and Warns West Not to Meddle," *New York Times*, 28 October 1991, A6; "U.S. Blames Mobutu for Violence in Zaire and Tells Him to Resign," *New York Times*, 22 July 1993, A4.

68. A similar configuration of actors in Panama at the end of the 1980s led to a stalemate between Noriega and civilian moderates. This stalemate was eventually broken by the U.S. invasion in 1989.

69. See the works cited in note 1.

70. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions," however, are careful not to link sultanism and revolution in a mechanical fashion. They emphasize that not all sultanistic regimes are toppled by revolutionaries.

71. Midlarsky and Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution," 187.

72. The brevity of this discussion, as well as its lumping together the Iranian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban regimes, obviously obscures important differences among these cases. For example, the Cuban military's capacity for autonomous action seems to have been somewhat greater than that of the Nicaraguan and Iranian armed forces. And the strength of the moderate opposition in Nicaragua seems to have been significantly greater than in the other two countries, leading to an "unconsolidated" revolutionary regime plagued by endemic conflict between moderates and maximalists after Somoza's ouster.

73. Although, in contrast to the rulers in the three revolutionary cases, Mobutu has not been highly dependent on a single foreign power.

74. Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited," 13. In a more structuralist vein, one could argue that the weakness of maximalists in Zaire is due more to a lack of "political cultures of opposition" than to actors' failures to utilize them.

75. On the role of "cultural idioms" in revolutionary change see Theda Skocpol, "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell," *Journal of Modern History* 57, no. 1 (1985): 86–96.

76. On African Marxist-Leninist regimes, see Marina Ottoway and David Ottoway, *Afro-Communism* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981).

77. See Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions*; Foran, "Theory of Third World Social Revolutions"; and Mansoor Moaddel, "Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 3 (1992): 353–79.

78. For a critique of recent comparative studies of revolution that conceptualize state and societal actors in radically different terms, ignoring the moral discourses and ideologies that motivate and shape the behavior of incumbent state elites, see Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 731–66.

79. For an analysis of the Paraguayan case see Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," 390–92.

80. A father-to-son transfer of power also occurred in Nicaragua in 1956. As in Haiti, this transition led to a lengthy continuation of sultanism followed eventually by regime breakdown. In both cases the collapse of sultanism resulted in part from the son's inability to maintain the system of patronage and elite co-optation constructed by the father.

81. Nicholls, *Haiti in Caribbean Context*, 226–28.
82. Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc*, 54–55.
83. Nicholls, *Haiti in Caribbean Context*, 228.
84. Abbott, *Haiti*, 288–90.
85. *Ibid.*, 290.
86. Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc*, 91–92, 110–11.
87. On the role of the Haitian Catholic Church in Duvalier's ouster see Abbott, *Haiti*, 261–92, and Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc*, 76–111.
88. My account of the U.S. role in the transition is based on Abbott, *Haiti*, 302–5, 328–30, and Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc*, 112.
89. According to Ferguson (*Papa Doc, Baby Doc*, 129), after Duvalier's departure the United States quickly sent the \$26 million in suspended aid to the military's National Council of Government (CNG), headed by General Namphy, and added \$10 million in emergency relief assistance, including \$400,000 in antiriot equipment for the police and army.
90. The discussion in this paragraph and the following one draws on Pamela Constable, "Haiti's Shattered Hopes," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no. 1 (1992): 41–51.
91. On the coup that removed Aristide see "Haitian Soldiers Seize President; Twenty-six Reported Killed in Uprising," *New York Times*, 1 October 1991, A1; Howard W. French, "Army Strikes Back," *New York Times*, 2 October 1991, A6. According to Constable ("Haiti's Shattered Hopes," 46), reports circulated that wealthy Haitians had encouraged the military to revolt against Aristide by offering cash payments and weapons shipments from abroad.
92. As should Haiti's "crisis of sovereignty," which culminated in U.S. invasion and occupation of the country from 1915 to 1934 and again in the summer of 1994.
93. The cases of Nicaragua and Paraguay can be regarded as *indirect* transfers of power to nonrevolutionary civilian rule after intervening periods of institutionalized authoritarian regimes. In Paraguay the armed forces, which ousted Stroessner, ceded control to civilian moderates after several months in power. In Nicaragua the revolutionary Sandinista leadership held relatively open and fair elections in 1984, which it won, and relinquished power after losing subsequent elections in 1990.
94. On the Dominican Republic, see Jonathan Hartlyn's contribution to this volume.
95. The case of Panama in 1989, where power was also transferred directly to civilians, does not fit the pattern described here because the regime transition was orchestrated by a U.S. invasion.
96. For an excellent analysis of the Philippine transition see Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
97. Claude A. Buss, *Cory Aquino and the People of the Philippines* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Alumni Association, 1987), 92. On the U.S. role in RAM's formation see Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 372.
98. Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, 438–46.
99. By contrast, in the revolutionary cases of Nicaragua, Iran, and Cuba the moderate oppositions were weak and divided.
100. The NDF was the political front of the New People's Army (NPA). On the NDF role in the transition see William Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 215–18.
101. Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, 441–43.
102. Quoted in *ibid.*, 445.
103. The relative strength of the Philippine moderate opposition is undoubtedly due in part to the size of the Philippine middle class and business community, which were much larger than their counterparts in the other cases of sultanism examined here.
104. Marcos relied more heavily on the regular armed forces to maintain internal control than did the Duvaliers, for example, who delegated this function to the Tonton Macoutes. On the role of the Philippine armed forces under Marcos see Felipe Miranda, "The Military," in *The Philippines after Marcos*, ed. R. J. May and Francisco Nemenzo (Kent, Eng.: Croom Helm, 1985), 45–69.
105. The loyalty of the armed forces to Aquino fluctuated after she became president. There were several coup attempts against her government by right-wing military factions. See Don Chapman, "Can Democracy Survive in the Philippines?" *Editorial Research Reports*, 10 August 1990, 446–59; John McBeth, "Who Are YOU? A New Military Reform Group Grows out of RAM," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 June 1990, 24–26.
106. The post-Ceausescu regime's opponents have characterized it as "neocommunist" and described the transition as a "revolution betrayed." See John Sislin, "Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation Front," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 24, no. 4 (1991): 395–411.
107. Ronald H. Linden, "Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Economy: The Case of Romania," *International Organization* 40, no. 2 (1986): 346–80.
108. My characterization of the Ceausescu regime draws on Mary Ellen Fischer, *Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania," *Government and Opposition* 24, no. 2 (1989): 177–98; William E. Crowther, "'Ceausescuism' and Civil-Military Relations in Romania," *Armed Forces and Society* 15, no. 2 (1989): 207–25; Daniel N. Nelson, *Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era* (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1988), esp. chap. 9 on ruler-military relations; and Walter Bacon, "Romanian Secret Police," in *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 135–54. Ceausescu's formula for stability bears striking resemblances to that of Stroessner in Paraguay, who counterbalanced the Colorado Party against the military. On Stroessner's regime see Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," 390–92.
109. The RCP's disenchantment with Ceausescu is revealed by an open letter addressed to him in March 1989 that was signed by six former top RCP leaders, including two former general secretaries. This letter denounced Ceausescu for, among other things, human rights abuses by the Securitate, economic mismanagement, and his "systematization" rural resettlement program. For the text of the letter and an analysis see Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The Rebellion of the Old Guard," *East European Reporter* 3, no. 4 (1989): 22–25. On military discontent with Ceausescu see Crowther, "'Ceausescuism' and Civil-Military Relations in Romania."
110. The leadership of the FSN included an assortment of former Communist Party officials who had fallen out of favor with Ceausescu, military officers, and political

dissidents. Ion Iliescu, the FSN's leader, had served as secretary of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee until 1971 and continued to be a Politburo member for several years afterward. See Mark Almond, "Romania since the Revolution," *Governments and Opposition* 25, no. 4 (1990): 484–96. For a comparative analysis of the Romanian transition see Jeff Goodwin, "Old Regimes and Revolutions in the Second and Third Worlds," *Social Science History* 18, no. 4 (1994): 574–604.

111. Although the Securitate, like the Tonton Macoutes, seems to have partially survived the transition. See Sislin, "Revolution Betrayed?" 408.

112. In terms of international factors, however, there are important differences between the Haitian and Romanian cases. First, Ceaușescu, unlike Jean-Claude Duvalier, was not highly dependent on a single superpower patron. Second, the effects of regional "demonstration effects" (which Huntington, *Third Wave*, refers to as "snowballing") were clearly more relevant in the Romanian case.

113. Path-dependent and "critical juncture" frameworks for political-historical analysis may be especially promising as strategies for embedding sultanistic regimes within long-term trajectories of change. Recent exemplary applications of such frameworks include Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See Mahoney and Snyder, "Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change," for a discussion of the strengths and limitations of path-dependent analyses.

114. The literature on whether authoritarian interludes "freeze" or transform politics seems especially relevant here. For an overview of this literature and the issues involved in analyzing politics after regime change see Frances Hagopian, "After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation and the Democratic Future of South America," *World Politics* 45, no. 3 (1993): 464–500.

115. See Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime," who stresses the importance of the conceptual distinction between regime and state for explaining varied paths of transition in southern Europe.

116. Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown."

117. On the critical role of counterfactuals in Stepan's analysis and in social science explanation in general, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 169–95.

118. One could argue, however, that structural factors other than the ones I have focused on are sufficient to explain the outcomes in these cases; hence there is no need to bring in "voluntarist" factors, only additional structural ones. This would be a rival to the explanatory claim made here that contingent choices and human agency "mattered."

119. See Gerardo L. Munck, "Between Theory and History and Beyond Traditional Area Studies: A New Comparative Perspective on Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 4 (1993): 475–98, and Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization," both of whom cite Collier and Collier's *Shaping the Political Arena* as an example of a path-dependent analysis that combines agency and structure in explaining regime change. The rest of this paragraph draws on Mahoney and Snyder, "Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change."

120. I am referring here to the nonintegrative, purely structural path-dependent analyses of regimes exemplified by Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966), and Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

4 • The Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic

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1. Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968), 179.

2. On the centrality of the Trujillo regime in inspiring Linz's initial formulation of the concept of sultanism, and for a further discussion of the traits that characterize these types of regimes, see chapter 1 of this volume.

3. Linz has defined "semiopposition" as "those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the system" (see also the editors' introduction to this volume, chaps. 1 and 2).

4. Bernardo Vega, *En la década perdida* (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1990), 157–58; Isis Duarte et al., *Cultura política y democracia en la República Dominicana: Informe final de la Encuesta Cultura Política y Democracia (DEMOS 94)* (Santo Domingo: Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1996), 205.

5. See H. Hoetink, "The Dominican Republic, c. 1870–1930," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, *Ca. 1970 to 1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 287–98; see also Frank Moya Pons, *Manual de Historia Dominicana*, 7th ed. (Santo Domingo: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1983), 281–426 passim.

6. Heureaux used large numbers of spies to control the country's population; co-opted or bribed many of his opponents, sending others into exile or murdering them; arranged for enemies overseas to be murdered; and massively enriched himself and his coterie through massive corruption. See Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration*, vol. 1 (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), 221. For a fascinating fictional dialogue between Heureaux and Trujillo, see Bernardo Vega, *Domini canes: Los perros del señor* (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1988).

7. Hoetink, "Dominican Republic," 296. As Wiarda notes, before 1899 presidents were usually of a racially mixed background; after that date until Trujillo assumed power, all presidents but one were white and of an aristocratic background. Wiarda, *Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration*, 363.

8. Moya Pons, *Manual*, 468–70.

9. See Bruce Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), xix; also Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971), esp. 13–16.