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Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes

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It is increasingly evident that the Third Wave of democracy had a strong undemocratic undertow. Despite the fact that an unprecedented number of countries experienced transitions to democracy since the mid-1970s, a wide range of nondemocratic regimes persisted across the globe. For example, entrenched totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes kept a firm grip on power in North Korea, Cuba, China, Laos, and Vietnam. Long-standing monarchies endured in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan.¹ Personalistic dictators survived in Libya, Zimbabwe, and Togo. And theocracies, ethnocracies, and military regimes remained in power in Iran, Syria, and Burma. Moreover, many countries experienced processes of political regime change that did not result in democracy. Regime change led to state collapse and protracted civil wars in Liberia, Cambodia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Zaire. In other instances, including many of the countries analyzed by the contributors to this volume, regime change resulted in the emergence of new nondemocratic regimes. The growing realization that the “victory of democracy” celebrated during the euphoria at the end of the Cold War was far from complete has led scholars increasingly to switch their focus from democratic transitions to the nondemocratic regimes of the contemporary era.

This switch requires that we tackle a key conceptual challenge: how to get beyond studying politics through the prism of democracy. The contributors to this book take a significant step in this direction because they break with what Thomas Carothers (2002) calls the “transition paradigm.”² From this perspective, which dominated the comparative study of regimes during the 1980s and 1990s, the many countries across the world in the “gray zone” between liberal democracy and full-blown authoritarianism were seen as qualified democracies in the process of moving toward full democracy. By contrast, the contributors regard these gray-zone countries as neither democratic nor in transition toward democracy. Instead of seeing such

In Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

regimes as democracies “with adjectives” and calling them, for example, “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 1997) or “semi-democracies” (Case 1996), the contributors to the present volume understand them as authoritarianisms with adjectives, calling them electoral authoritarian regimes.³ This change in labels marks an important gestalt shift away from the transition paradigm.

Despite this gestalt shift, students of world politics still face a series of key unresolved challenges in their quest to understand the variety of nondemocratic regimes. In this chapter, I argue that the burgeoning literature on contemporary nondemocratic regimes, much like the literature on democratic regimes, places an overwhelming emphasis on the electoral process and thus overlooks other fundamental dimensions that are critical for analyzing regimes. This focus on elections results in two important shortcomings. First, it leads to a neglect of how the political consequences of elections depend on their interaction with key extra-electoral factors. To get beyond this limitation, I highlight four extra-electoral dimensions deployed in a long tradition of comparative research on political regimes: (1) Who rules? Party elites, a personal leader, the military, or the clergy? (2) How do rulers rule? By means of patron-client networks, ethnic ties, or a mass-based party?⁴ (3) Why do rulers rule? Out of greed, ethnic hatred, or a commitment to a religion or ideology? and (4) How much do rulers rule? That is, does anybody really rule and, if so, to what degree?⁵ Second, the heavy emphasis on electoral competition in research on nondemocratic regimes leads to a severe underappreciation of the wide range of regimes in the world today that lack even the trappings of democracy. Understanding the full spectrum of nondemocratic regimes requires a broader conceptual framework, one that gets beyond the limited focus on electoral politics and competition seen in much recent work.

Setting Elections in Context: Who Rules, How, and Why?

The fortunes of nondemocratic regimes that hold elections are shaped in crucial ways by variation in the type of rulers (e.g., military, personal leader, or a political party); whether the rulers govern mainly through patronage networks, ethnic ties, or mass parties; and the motives that drive rulers in their quest for power (e.g., greed, religion, ideology). Understanding how such regimes work and evolve thus requires that we explore the interactions among electoral processes and other dimensions of nondemocratic rule. A brief comparison of electoral processes in military and personalistic regimes illustrates this point.

A fundamental fact distinguishes elections in most military regimes from elections in other types of nondemocratic regimes: the incumbents

have guns, whereas the opposition does not.⁶ Because they directly control the means of coercion, rulers in military regimes may have a stronger capacity than rulers in other types of regimes to reverse processes of change set in motion by elections.⁷ Indeed, military rulers can even lose competitive elections yet still keep office, as occurred in Burma in 1990 and Algeria in 1992.⁸ In these cases, competitive elections and incumbent defeat at the polls resulted not in democratization but in the reequilibration of the nondemocratic regime.⁹ Understanding this outcome requires that we focus on who rules: because a cohesive military organization governed in both Burma and Algeria, incumbents were able to survive defeat at the polls and keep their grip on power.

In contrast to military regimes, the ruler in personalistic regimes does not always directly control the means of coercion: depending on how far the ruler's patronage network penetrates the armed forces, the military apparatus may be able to act autonomously from the ruler (see Snyder 1992 and 1998). In cases such as Haiti and the Philippines in 1986, the military played a central role in toppling personalistic dictators in the context of a wider societal crisis. The case of the Philippines is especially interesting, because the crisis that led factions of the military to turn against Ferdinand Marcos was precipitated by the dictator's decision to hold “snap elections.”¹⁰

Yet a focus on elections by itself is insufficient to explain why autonomous groups turn against a ruler: electoral competition may galvanize defections by disgruntled elites, but it does not explain why a pool of disaffected actors emerges in the first place. Addressing this question requires a focus on the prior issue of how personalistic regimes rule—that is, via patron-client networks. As a result, personalistic rulers usually fill the top leadership posts in the armed forces and other government agencies with their cronies, relatives, and clients. This practice can form a “crony glass ceiling” that alienates career officers, cadres, and bureaucrats, thus potentially generating a large pool of disgruntled elites prone to turn against the regime in a crisis. For example, in the Philippines, approximately 10 percent of military officers were members of the Reform the Armed Forces Now Movement (RAM), which had been organized by officers disturbed by the influx of Marcos's patronage appointees (Buss 1987; Bonner 1988: 372). In the context of widespread public outrage over Marcos's use of violence and fraud during the “snap elections” of February 1986, a group of some 300 officers from the RAM launched a military coup against the dictator. Although the coup failed, it emboldened tens of thousands of civilians, mobilized by the Catholic Church, who formed a human buffer to protect the mutinous officers. This outpouring of “people power” led to a wave of military defections and to Marcos's departure from the country three days later (Bonner 1988).

As seen in the overthrow of Marcos in the Philippines, electoral competition may galvanize disgruntled members of the regime who defect from

the ruler, but it does not explain why a group of disgruntled elites forms in the first place. Understanding the prior question of why splits emerge in some personalistic regimes in the face of elections thus requires that we look beyond elections, which may merely be the proximate trigger for such splits, by considering whether the infrastructure of political power, that is, patron-client networks, generates a pool of frustrated actors, like the RAM in the Philippines, ready to turn against the ruler in a crisis.

Moreover, a focus on why rulers rule (that is, on the purpose of power) can also help explain the contrasting consequences of crises in nondemocratic regimes, whether or not these crises are linked to elections.¹¹ Personalistic rulers rarely rule in the name of religion or ideology. Instead, they are more often motivated by greed (Chehabi and Linz 1998a). Hence, their willingness to relinquish power in the face of a crisis may be greater than that of theocratic or totalitarian rulers, who rule in the name of a "cause" for which they may even be willing to die. By contrast, if their Swiss bank accounts are large enough, personalistic rulers may be willing to relinquish power if guaranteed a safe haven abroad. Jean-Claude Duvalier, who left Haiti for a peaceful life in France; Alfredo Stroessner, who fled Paraguay for Brazil; Mobutu Sese Seko, who left Zaire for Morocco; and, more recently, Charles Taylor, who fled Liberia for Nigeria, illustrate this possibility. Still, new international norms of holding former dictators accountable through the International Criminal Court may make variation in why rulers rule less relevant for predicting which rulers cede control peacefully. As the possibility of a comfortable life in exile as a "retired dictator" diminishes, even rulers motivated by greed, instead of a utopian vision of societal transformation, may refuse to leave office except by force.

Elections and Stateness: How Much Do Rulers Rule?

In addition to setting elections in the context of the means of nondemocratic rule and the motives of nondemocratic rulers, students of contemporary nondemocratic regimes should focus more attention on how elections interact with a further extra-electoral dimension: the degree of rule, or stateness. Elections in nondemocratic contexts can have sharply contrasting effects on stateness, subverting state capacity in some instances and strengthening it in others. In turn, electoral processes themselves are influenced in crucial ways by how much the rulers rule.

State-Subverting Elections

Although elections in some nondemocratic regimes may be mere window dressing, in other instances they have important consequences for the stability of the incumbent regime. Hence, as Andreas Schedler (2002b: 49) puts it,

elections may be "regime-sustaining," or "regime-subverting."¹² Yet the power of elections in nondemocratic regimes may be even greater than students of electoral authoritarianism have generally acknowledged: in addition to affecting the stability of regimes, elections can also influence the stability of states. For example, in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Haiti, elections contributed to state collapse and hence can be considered state-subverting. By contrast, in Spain, elections played an important role in holding together the state.¹³ Such cases further highlight why it is important not to analyze elections and other democratic trappings of nondemocratic regimes in isolation from the broader political and societal context. In particular, we need to explore how the degree of rule affects elections and, in turn, how elections affect the degree of rule.

Events in Haiti highlight how electoral competition can contribute to state collapse. In Haiti, an impasse stemming from fraudulent legislative and boycotted presidential elections was a major cause of state breakdown. After his fraudulent victory in legislative elections in 2000 and his subsequent reelection to a five-year term as president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide focused his efforts on repressing the only internationally legitimate opposition group: the "electoral opposition" comprised of moderate elites who were willing to play by the rules of the electoral game but had boycotted Aristide's reelection. Aristide's strategy of repressing moderate elites ironically helped strengthen the hand of armed rebels who would eventually take control of much of the country. Moreover, Aristide's dismantling of the army in 1995 and his "patrimonialization" of the police (for example, by installing cronies as police chiefs to make the police force loyal to his person) helped further strengthen the hand of the armed opposition, which was led by former members of the disbanded Haitian Army and by paramilitary forces, such as the "Cannibal Army" of Gonaives, that had previously been loyal to Aristide. These armed groups took advantage of (1) the Haitian state's weak coercive apparatus (i.e., no army and a small, poorly equipped police force); (2) its inability to control the 200-mile-long border with the Dominican Republic, where many of the rebels took refuge and organized; and (3) the weakness of the moderate opposition, which resulted in part from Aristide's repressive measures against them. Combined with state weakness, the stalemate between the regime and moderate, nonarmed opposition groups resulting from the electoral boycott of 2000 helped trigger Haiti's collapse into civil war and chaos in 2004. Elections held by a nondemocratic regime thus proved state-subverting.

Elections Without States?

When elections are held in the context of collapsed states and civil war, as occurred in Liberia in 1997 and Sierra Leone in 1996, they do not confer power because there is no usable state apparatus that bears...

the winners of elections.¹⁴ Rather, elections serve at best to ratify the balance of power over territory, people, and resources created by war. Hence, the winners of “elections without states” must supply their own infrastructure of power—soldiers, administrative personnel, and so forth—in order to govern.

In collapsed states, phenomena routinely associated with elections, such as parties, pluralism, and competition, acquire bizarre meanings. The parties who compete in elections are armed groups led by warlords; pluralism refers to the number and variety of armed groups in the territory; and competition is waged by bullets, not ballots. A focus on elections in such cases ignores the far more fundamental matter of competition among armed groups for control over territory and resources. Yet the holding of elections has curiously led some observers to classify cases of civil war and collapsed states, like Liberia and Angola, as “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” regimes (see, for example, Diamond 2002: 30–31). Moreover, because international observers may certify elections in collapsed states as relatively clean and fair, such cases may even earn a semirespectable, “partly free” rating from Freedom House, as seen in Sierra Leone’s score in 2001 of 4 on the political rights index and 5 on the civil liberties index.¹⁵ Yet classifying such cases as electoral authoritarian regimes makes little sense: in the absence of a state, there is no regime, and that holds true whether or not there are competitive, internationally certified elections. Instead of classifying such cases based on their democratic trappings, we should focus instead on their low degree of rule, that is, on the prior, more fundamental issue of state(less)ness.

Inside the Black Box of “Closed Regimes”

A focus on extra-electoral factors is necessary not only to understand the dynamics of regimes that hold elections but also to describe and hence classify the full spectrum of contemporary nondemocratic regimes. Recent efforts to conceptualize regimes that occupy what Schedler (2002b: 37) calls the “foggy zone” between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism take a useful step toward understanding the variety of regimes in the post-Cold War world. Yet the emphasis on hybrid regimes that hold elections has led to an unfortunate neglect of the wide range of cases that lack democratic features or trappings. Although the agenda of research on the foggy zone is valuable, we should not overlook the dark zone inhabited by so-called closed regimes with no democratic aspects.

The neglect of the dark zone has resulted in the shoehorning of cases as distinct as China, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia into the catch-all category “closed regimes.”¹⁶ This category suffers from serious limitations. First, the

category of closed authoritarianism lumps together a wide variety of quite distinct cases, including totalitarian and post-totalitarian systems like China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and Laos; theocracies like Iran and Afghanistan under the Taliban; sultanates like Brunei; nontraditional personalistic regimes like Turkmenistan and Libya; traditional monarchies like Swaziland, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia; military regimes like Burma; and ethnocracies like Syria and Burundi.

The category closed authoritarianism also collapses the important distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, thereby creating an unnecessary and counterproductive disjuncture with prior research on non-democratic systems.¹⁷ The category closed authoritarianism lumps regimes that are mass-mobilizing and ideologically based, such as North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, China, and perhaps Iraq until the US invasion of 2003, with regimes that are not. Likewise, closed authoritarianism glosses over important distinctions drawn in earlier typologies between military and personalistic regimes. In sum, using the category of closed authoritarianism to classify nondemocratic regimes that lack democratic trappings creates a disconnect with previous regime typologies, thereby making it harder to achieve cumulative knowledge about world politics.

A final limitation of the category closed authoritarianism concerns its lumping together of countries where, to use Samuel P. Huntington’s language, the “government governs” (e.g., China, Vietnam) with countries where the government does not govern, if there even is a government (e.g., Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda). As Huntington (1968: 1) famously put it, “the most important distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.” The category of closed authoritarianism fails to differentiate collapsed states that lack political order from totalitarian regimes that suffer the opposite problem—too much order. In countries with a high degree of government, life is predictable and stable for most citizens, whereas predictability is utterly lacking in cases where warlords, bandits, and chaos are the dominant force.¹⁸ Indeed, in cases of state collapse it makes little sense to speak of any regime, much less a closed one, because the metaphor “closed” falsely implies that access to power is restricted by incumbent rulers. In the context of state collapse, a more appropriate metaphor is a false door, as on a movie set, that has no real edifice behind it: a doorway to nowhere. If the putatively “closed” regime were to “open” by holding free and fair elections, the victors who pass through the “opening” would not gain access to power, because there is no state apparatus to confer power.¹⁹ Likewise, where state institutions are collapsed, those “inside” a so-called closed regime do not have power by virtue of their location, because there is no state apparatus. Instead, they must supply or create their own power resources and infrastructure. Thus a victorious rebel army in a

country without a state cannot govern by taking over the state's coercive and administrative apparatus, because there is no such apparatus to take over. It makes little sense to classify such cases as closed regimes.

Two sharply contrasting pathways into the dark zone can readily be identified: too much political order (e.g., North Korea) and too little political order (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo). In fact, the lack of a robust state apparatus capable of intensive, widespread repression may partly explain Larry Diamond's (2002: 26) observation that the "steady overall rise of freedom in the world" is "partly seen in the shrinking number and proportion of states with the two most repressive average freedom scores of 6.5 and 7.0." Hence, in 2001, a collapsed state like Sierra Leone received an average freedom score of 4.5, whereas North Korea, which had the state capacity to fully extinguish political and civil liberties, earned a score of 7.²⁰ Yet is it fruitful to call Sierra Leone in 2001, where chaos and anarchy prevailed and life approximated the Hobbesian state of nature, more "free" than North Korea?

Classifying regimes on the basis of closedness proves unsatisfactory because it (1) creates a disconnect with earlier frameworks for conceptualizing nondemocratic regimes, thus making it harder to generate cumulative knowledge about the political world; and (2) ignores other, more important dimensions, especially stateness, that are crucial for successfully mapping the wide range of polities in the world today.

Conclusion: Steps Ahead

Although electoral competition is a notable feature of many contemporary nondemocratic regimes, we should not overstate the importance of elections. First, many nondemocratic regimes lack elections or other democratic features. Second, even in nondemocratic regimes that do hold elections, the effect of electoral competition on the fortunes of these regimes depends on extra-electoral factors. Third, as students of democratic regimes increasingly emphasize, democracy itself involves far more than just elections (see, for example, O'Donnell 2001). Understanding the spectrum of political regimes in the post-Cold War era thus requires a conceptual framework that goes beyond the electoral process. In this chapter, I took two steps toward building such a framework. First, I specified four critical dimensions that interact with electoral contestation and thus determine how it affects the fortunes of nondemocratic regimes: Who rules? How do rulers rule? Why do rulers rule? And how much do rulers rule? Second, I opened the black box of closed regimes and showed how a focus on the degree of rule, or stateness, provides a stronger basis for understanding these cases than does a focus on closedness.

What further steps should be taken to strengthen our understanding of the spectrum of nondemocratic regimes? First, we need to do a far better job taking stock of existing conceptual frameworks before we propose new ones. Because they put the democratic trappings of nondemocracies, that is, elections and political contestation, at the center of analysis, recent efforts to classify nondemocratic regimes often fail to connect with prior categories and typologies of nondemocratic regimes, which focused centrally on variations in who rules, how rulers rule, and why rulers rule. This delinking from the stock of knowledge is often a deliberate move justified with the argument that the nondemocratic regimes of the post-Cold War era are *sui generis* and hence do not fit the old categories. New concepts are thus required to describe and understand these regimes. Yet the costs of delinking from earlier efforts to conceptualize nondemocratic regimes are high: conceptual fragmentation poses a serious barrier to theory building and the accumulation of knowledge. Because of these potentially high costs of conceptual innovation, prudence is warranted.

Maximizing the prospects for achieving cumulative knowledge requires a conservative bias with regard to concept formation. We should resist the naturalist's temptation to proclaim the discovery, naming, and classification of new political animals. Instead of rushing willy-nilly to coin neologisms in the hope of reaping a handsome profit in the marketplace of ideas, we should first carefully evaluate the "null hypothesis" that the political phenomena of interest, in this case, contemporary nondemocratic regimes, are actually *not* sufficiently novel to warrant any new categories and labels. If this null hypothesis proves false, then we should try to salvage and retain as much as possible from earlier conceptual schemes. In either case, an earnest and careful effort to take stock of earlier conceptualizations is required before a legitimate claim can be made for a new type or subtype. Otherwise, we run a grave risk of conceptual amnesia and chaos that can block the accumulation of knowledge in regime studies, and, even worse, cause the loss, or decumulation, of knowledge.

In the spirit of avoiding conceptual amnesia, a fruitful starting point for achieving a stronger understanding of the spectrum of contemporary nondemocratic regimes is Juan Linz's (1975) influential typology of regimes, arguably the most comprehensive effort in modern social science to map the variety of regimes. Linz's typology is organized around three core dimensions: (1) the degree of pluralism; (2) the degree of mobilization; and (3) the degree of ideology.²¹ How relevant are Linz's three dimensions for understanding nondemocratic regimes thirty years later? Does the task of developing an updated typology require new dimensions? If so, what might these dimensions be?

A focus on the degree of pluralism clearly remains relevant for analyzing variation among nondemocratic regimes today. Indeed, the pluralism

dimension has absorbed virtually all the attention of scholars whose work highlights the democratic trappings (e.g., electoral contestation and competitiveness) of modern nondemocratic regimes. By contrast, Linz's other two dimensions—mobilization and ideology—have been strikingly neglected. At first glance, the tendency to fixate on pluralism to the exclusion of mobilization and ideology seems justified by the paucity of patently mobilizational regimes in the world today. The mobilizational forms that characterized the fascist and communist regimes of the twentieth century—mass rallies animated by songs and pageantry, endless parades of goose-stepping troops, mass parties, and so on—seem extinct with the exception of a few vestigial cases like North Korea and Cuba. The apparent demise or, at least, hiatus, of mobilizational regimes goes hand in hand with the crisis of ideology that accompanied the end of the Cold War—after all, mass political mobilization probably requires ideology. Still, as Linz (2000) himself cautions, it may be premature to declare the end of mobilization and ideology. The most likely candidates today for a new wave of mobilizing regimes are religious fundamentalism, especially Islamic fundamentalism, and nationalism. Indeed, a variety of “anti-Western” ideologies can be seen among opposition groups across countries with democratic and nondemocratic regimes, ranging from Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East and Asia to factions of indigenous movements across Latin America (most notably in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico), which seek political and cultural autonomy in response to exclusion from national democratic politics and the extraction of natural resources by foreign companies. It remains to be seen whether and how these opposition groups will win power and the kind of regimes they will establish if they do. In addition to these strongly anti-Western ideologies, a softer strand of anti-Western thought can be seen in the “Asian values” invoked to legitimate developmental authoritarian regimes in Singapore and Malaysia. Another example of soft anti-Westernism can be found in the nationalist populism of the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela, which has demonstrated a strong capacity to mobilize poor, urban dwellers. As these examples suggest, it would be a mistake to treat the post-Cold War era as postideological, and hence, postmobilizational.

If the three core dimensions of Linz's 1975 typology—pluralism, mobilization, and ideology—still have great relevance, are any new dimensions warranted to understand the spectrum of contemporary nondemocratic regimes? The proliferation of failed and collapsed states after the end of the Cold War, especially in Africa, points clearly to one such dimension: the degree of rule, or stateness. This dimension highlights the territorially uneven nature of political power and authority, which in turn brings into focus subnational nondemocratic regimes, ranging from petty despots (e.g., subnational sultanism) to more institutionalized, subnational authoritarian enclaves, such as the state- and local-level party machines in some regions of India and Mexico. A territorially disaggregated, geographically nuanced

perspective on political regimes, one that captures variation in the reach of the central state as well as in the forms of rule at the subnational level, would strengthen our understanding of contemporary nondemocratic politics.²²

A final dimension that merits consideration concerns how advances in information technology affect the capacity of nondemocrats to capture and keep political power. Information is a key aspect of control and hence political power, both in democratic and nondemocratic systems. Although a few political scientists and sociologists have turned to the study of “e-democracy,” focusing, for example, on electronic voting and how citizens interact with government agencies and state officials through Internet websites and e-mail,²³ little, if any, work has been done on “e-authoritarianism.” It could prove fruitful to explore the implications of recent advances in the technology of surveillance for the maintenance of modern nondemocratic regimes (that is, for how rulers rule). The case of Singapore, where hidden sensors and cameras are reportedly installed in public elevators and bathrooms, probably approximates most closely the Orwellian Big Brother nightmare. Still, the increasing miniaturization and rapidly falling cost of surveillance technology presumably makes Singaporean-style voyeurism more feasible for a wide range of nondemocratic rulers.²⁴ New information technologies—especially e-mail and websites—may also make it easier for rulers to disseminate their propaganda and hence cultivate support, both domestically and internationally.

Another intriguing aspect of new information technologies for students of nondemocratic politics concerns how cell phones, e-mail, and Internet websites may empower antidemocratic opposition groups. For example, online “virtual mobilization,” as utilized by some Islamic fundamentalist organizations, may serve as a partial surrogate for the marches and rallies of the mass-based, antidemocratic movements of the twentieth century.²⁵ The use of websites to broadcast decapitations of hostages has proven a potent way for small groups of Islamic insurgents to get their “message” out to a worldwide audience. Students of democratic politics have fruitfully explored how modern communication technologies, especially television, transformed mass-based political parties; students of nondemocratic politics could also gain insight by considering how new technologies affect the strategies and fortunes of nondemocratic opposition groups.

A focus on pluralism, mobilization, and ideology, combined with a focus on the territorially uneven nature of state power and the implications of new information technologies for authoritarian rulers and oppositions, will provide a stronger understanding of the spectrum of modern nondemocratic regimes.

Notes

I thank Gerardo Munck for extensive comments on this chapter. I also appreciate helpful suggestions from Jason Brownlee and Ellen Lust-Okar.

1. On the persistent nondemocratic regimes of the Middle East, see Bellin (2004), Lust-Okar (2005), and Posusney and Angrist (2005).
2. For a related challenge to the "transition paradigm," see the symposium on "Elections Without Democracy" in the *Journal of Democracy* 13/2 (April 2002).
3. On "democracy with adjectives," see Collier and Levitsky (1997).
4. Elections are also a means that nondemocratic regimes have used to maintain control (Hermet 1982; Schedler 2002b). Yet even when they serve this purpose, elections occur infrequently and, hence, are not "everyday forms" of nondemocratic rule.
5. See Brooker (2000: especially Chap. 2), for a good overview and synthesis of earlier efforts to classify nondemocratic systems. The dimension of stateness (how much rulers rule) has been less central to prior work on regimes. See Linz and Stepan (1996) for an important exception.
6. Although military regimes are not extinct, the number of such regimes has clearly decreased since the end of the Cold War. This demilitarization of contemporary nondemocratic regimes, which has not received much attention in the literature, likely results from (1) the increasing illegitimacy of military rule in an international context that favors the appearance of democratic rule: military regimes are among the most patently nondemocratic forms of rule; and (2) the exhaustion in the 1980s and 1990s of the "statist-developmental ideology" that legitimated many military regimes as "developmentalist" during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. One wonders whether the increasing evidence of a return of statist economic interventions, for example, across Latin America, might eventually serve to re-legitimize a role for the armed forces in politics.
7. Still, it should not be taken for granted that military regimes enjoy a total monopoly over the means of coercion: even the high-capacity, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s faced armed guerrilla insurgencies.
8. Technically, Algeria's regime was a single-party regime led by the National Liberation Front. Yet the military's role became so central by 1992 that it is best characterized as a military-single party hybrid. In Algeria, the military stepped in to put an end to the country's first experiment with competitive elections in 1992, after the Islamic Salvation Front won the first round of two-round legislative elections.
9. The concept of regime reequilibration is from Linz (1978).
10. The best analysis of the transition to democracy in the Philippines is Thompson (1995). See Brownlee (2004) for a fine comparative study of the contrasting effects of elections on the fortunes of nondemocratic rulers in the Philippines, Iran, Malaysia, and Egypt.
11. See also Thompson and Kuntz, Chapter 7 in this book.
12. See also Hermet (1982) on how elections may be an important instrument that helps incumbent nondemocratic elites keep power.
13. See Linz and Stepan (1996) on the interaction of elections, regime institutions, and stateness in Russia, Yugoslavia, and Spain.
14. On the Liberian elections, see Carter Center (n.d.). On usable state apparatuses as a key dimension of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, see Linz and Stepan (1996).
15. The Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indexes are both on a seven-point scale, with a score of 1 indicating a very high degree of political rights and civil liberties. The "average Freedom House score" is the average of a country's scores on the Freedom House political rights index and civil liberties index.

16. According to Schedler (2002b: 48), "closed authoritarian regimes" represent just 16.5 percent of a sample of 192 countries, whereas electoral authoritarian regimes represent 38.4 percent. Still, the category of regimes that are conventionally classified as "closed authoritarianism" includes the world's most populous country, China, as well as other countries with large populations (e.g., Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Congo). Hence, whether or not the number of countries with closed regimes is, in fact, relatively small, a very large share of the world's people still lives under such political forms.

17. The *locus classicus* of the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes is the work of Juan Linz (1964, 1975).

18. Indeed, even death was more or less orderly and predictable for many victims of totalitarian regimes.

19. For an important analysis of how the distinction between "access to power" and "exercise of power" serves to clarify the conceptualization of political regimes, see Mazzuca (forthcoming).

20. On how state capacity shapes the ability of nondemocratic regimes to govern, see Lucan Way's contribution to this book in Chapter 10.

21. Linz's rich and complex analysis contained numerous other dimensions, for example, which groups were excluded from or, alternatively, allowed to participate in the regime, but these three dimensions were the main ones. See Linz and Stepan (1996) for a revised version of the typology that treats sultanistic and post-totalitarian regimes as distinct categories, rather than as subtypes of authoritarianism.

22. Analytic strategies for studying subnational authoritarian regimes are discussed in Snyder (2001).

23. On e-democracy, see, for example, West (2005).

24. Intensified state surveillance of citizens can also be seen in democratic regimes. For example, to counter crime, downtown Wilmington, Delaware, is blanketed by video cameras connected to the authorities.

25. Any member of a contentious social science department understands well how e-mail can serve as an effective tool for mobilizing support and building coalitions. The observation that advances in information technology may place new tools in the hands of antidemocratic opposition groups raises a number of interesting counterfactual historical questions. For example, what might the Nazi or Bolshevik movements have looked like if they had had access to e-mail, cellular telephones, and websites?