

**Who is Safe?**  
**Varieties of Security in an American City**

Rebecca Bell-Martin\*  
Jerome Marston\*\*  
Richard Snyder\*\*\*

Department of Political Science  
Brown University  
Providence, RI

*Abstract:* The public good of local safety can be provided by a host of public, private and community agents combining in a multiplicity of different ways. Even in a small American city like Providence, Rhode Island, we observe striking variation in the provision of local security across neighborhoods. To describe and explain these local varieties of security, we propose a multilateral, multilevel and subnational framework. In conjunction with new techniques for measuring the territorial distribution of security assets, such as the novel measures of *policing disproportionality* (POLDIS) that we introduce, the framework offers a far stronger understanding not only of “who is safe,” but also how and why.

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\* Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science, Brown University. [Rebecca.Martin@brown.edu](mailto:Rebecca.Martin@brown.edu)

\*\* Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science, Brown University. [Jerome.Marston@brown.edu](mailto:Jerome.Marston@brown.edu)

\*\*\* Professor of Political Science, Brown University. [Richard.Snyder@brown.edu](mailto:Richard.Snyder@brown.edu)

In a political community where all citizens are equal in terms of their votes, why do sharp inequalities in crime and public safety occur across small distances? What are the causes of this unequal security at the local level and, in turn, what factors make it durable? What options are available to citizens for improving their security when conventional providers, like the police, are either unwilling or unable to do so?

This paper addresses question such as these by proposing a new theoretical framework for explaining varieties of citizen security. The framework is anchored in two fundamental assumptions. First, we argue that security at the local level is not, as is often understood, mainly a function of the state's policing capabilities. Rather local security is a *multilateral* good in that it can potentially be provided by a diverse array of state and non-state actors. Moreover, depending on their capabilities and willingness to work together, state and non-state actors may be able to coproduce, and thereby enhance, security. Second, we argue that just as crime is often distributed in a spatially uneven manner, so are the capabilities of both the state and non-state actors who can provide security. This spatial unevenness in capabilities, in turn, defines the set of feasible options available to citizens for achieving security.

We deploy our theoretical framework by exploring cross-neighborhood variation in security in the city of Providence, RI, a small yet ethnically diverse, US city with a relatively high crime rate.<sup>1</sup> The framework provides a better understanding of unequal security by showing how public, private and community forces work together to coproduce high levels of security in some neighborhoods whereas in others these same forces are weak or unable to cooperate, resulting in far less security. By highlighting how security at the neighborhood level results from the interplay among a diverse set of state and non-state actors with territorially uneven capabilities and inclinations to cooperate, our theoretical framework offers a stronger understanding of local inequalities in citizen security. Moreover, by getting beyond the conventional focus on the police and including a far broader set of actors, such as private institutions and community groups, who can potentially provide local security, the framework shows that security can be achieved in multiple and surprising ways.

The next section discusses existing research on crime and the provision of public goods, showing how the latter, with its focus on multilateral and multilevel provision combined with a subnational perspective, offers fruitful building blocks for a theoretical framework that can explain local variation and inequality in security. Drawing on the principles of multilateral and multilevel provision of security, subsequent sections develop and operationalize a framework for explaining local security anchored in a new typology of varieties of security. The following section shows how the framework can be used to explain the contrasting pathways to local security seen across neighborhoods in the city of Providence. A concluding section summarizes the argument about varieties of security and suggests directions for future research on local security.

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<sup>1</sup> In a recent report released by CQ Press ranking US cities from the highest crime rate to the lowest, Providence ranked 87th out of 400 cities. Still, Providence is one of the safer mid-sized cities in New England with Springfield ranking 35th and Hartford ranking 19th. Also, the overall crime rate and arrest rates in Providence and its peer cities across New England has been declining significantly over the past decade.

## Existing Perspectives on Crime and Provision of Public Goods

Our study of varieties of security draws on and contributes to existing research across several areas, including crime and crime prevention and state-society “coproduction” of public goods.

### *Crime and Crime Prevention*

The criminology field largely aims to explain crime and law enforcement efforts to prevent crime. This field addresses questions such as: Who is likely to commit crime? Where is crime likely to happen? Why does crime occur? How does one prevent crime? The field has relatively little to say about *security*. While related, crime and security are not synonymous. Indeed, one might posit that “security” implies the absence of or protection from crime. As such, “security” implies not merely the absence of crime, but more so the various elements that lead to the condition of being “secure,” that is, the state of feeling “safe, stable and free from fear or anxiety” (Oxford Dictionary).

This distinction between crime and security is important. First, citizens’ evaluations of security often deviate from actual crime trends, suggesting that forces other than crime alone shape whether and how citizens feel secure (see for example Lopez and Lukinbeal 2010; Orr and West 2007). Schneider, Rowell, and Bezdikian 2003, for example, find that increased crime prevention efforts can actually *provoke*, not allay, citizen fears of crime. Second, threats to a community’s sense of security may occur in ways that are not legally criminal or that do not fall under the purview of law enforcement. Third, the common criminological response to crime – public law enforcement and judicial processes – may *contribute to* fear and insecurity among many populations (see for example Orr and West 2007; Collins 1998). Fourth, security does not theoretically have to come from the police. Third-party actors, whether they be citizens or private agents, can also provide security. Thus, while criminological scholarship makes foundational contributions to explaining the who, what, where, when, and how of crime and policing, our understanding of how individuals and communities achieve *security* is not wholly addressed by an emphasis on crime and policing alone.

Still, the criminology literature sheds important light on citizen satisfaction and/or disenchantment with the state via studies on citizen (dis)satisfaction with the police (see for example Orr and West 2007). Understanding why and how citizens come to evaluate public law enforcement the way they do is important because such evaluations may shape whether and how citizens pursue alternative, and/or complementary, non-state forms of security provision that we discuss in this paper. For example, theories of criminology would suggest that citizens who perceive the police to be “legitimate” are more likely to cooperate with state policing institutions on crime prevention (see for example Tyler and Fagan 2008). Research on community self-help practices and “legal cynicism,” that is, when citizens view the law and its agents as illegitimate and unresponsive, suggests that citizens who regard law enforcement and legal institutions as illegitimate are more likely to pursue non-state and extralegal avenues for achieving security (Black 1983).

Relatedly, criminological approaches share important insights about the conditions under which the state, citizens, and private entities cooperate, especially in crime prevention initiatives. “Community policing” models, for example, typically hinge on the notion that cooperation

between citizens and police strengthens crime prevention (see for example Goldstein 1990), and related studies show that citizens in higher-crime neighborhoods are more likely to participate in state-sponsored initiatives like neighborhood watch programs (Pattavina, Byrne, and Garcia 2006). “Third-party policing,” meanwhile, refers to contemporary moves to privatize some policing functions and outsource others to private citizens (Mazerolle and Ransley 1998, 2005). Together, this work helpfully points to the importance of viewing security as a *multilateral* good, that is, something that can be produced by cooperation among a diverse set of local actors.

Despite these insights, existing research on crime and crime prevention tends to set aside difficult social and political questions that look beyond explaining crime and crime prevention. Few studies ask, for example, “*For whom* does cooperation with the state increase (or decrease) security?” “*Who* gains access to the state through cooperating on crime prevention (and who is excluded)?” And, in the case of those for whom engagement with the state is not a viable option, “How do the excluded achieve security?” Yet these are precisely the kinds of distributional and, ultimately, political questions that need to be addressed in order to understand local varieties and inequalities of security. A more fruitful way to address such issues can be found in theories of the provision of public goods and services.

### *Multilateral, Multilevel and Subnational Provision of Public Goods*

With several key modifications, research on the provision of public goods provides helpful building blocks for a framework for understanding local variation in access to security. First, this research helpfully highlights how public goods and services, including security, can be most effectively produced not unilaterally by a single actor, usually assumed to be the state, but *multilaterally* through cooperative arrangements that encompass a diverse set of actors in the public, private, and community realms.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, these actors can operate at different scales and levels, for example local, state and federal agencies.<sup>3</sup> Finally, beginning with Ostrom’s pioneering work in the 1970s on the “coproduction” of local law enforcement, research on public goods provision has been distinguished by its focus on subnational, especially, local levels of analysis. Together, this combination of multilateral, multilevel and subnational perspectives found in research on public goods offers an excellent foundation for building a theoretical framework that explains local inequalities in security.

Beginning with pioneering work in the 1960s by Elinor Ostrom on “coproduction” of public goods, a robust literature has emerged on how non-state organizations and citizens can contribute to the provision of public goods and services conventionally provided by state agencies, including security. Coproduction refers to the “process through which inputs from individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization are transformed into goods and services” (Ostrom 1996, 1073).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A similar move toward unpacking the notion of public goods providers and acknowledging their diversity can be seen in recent research on non-state provision. See especially Cammett 2014; Cammett and MacLean 2014; and Allard, Wathen, and Danziger 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Our understanding of multilateral provision of public goods resembles the notion of “polycentricity,” as presented by V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961: 831-32)

<sup>4</sup> In most cases, state agencies are expected to provide a good or service, and non-state actors can cooperate with state actors to help the latter fulfill their obligations. According to Ostrom, depending on their incentives to cooperate, state actors can either encourage or, alternatively, discourage coproduction (1996, 1073).

Ostrom and her collaborators introduced the concept of coproduction to explain why crime rates increased in Chicago when the city's police officers withdrew from street patrols into cars. Ostrom found that by retreating to their cars and relinquishing regular face-to-face contact with neighborhood residents, police officers lost access to a crucial source of information required for effective crime control: local information provided by residents. Whereas residents had previously participated with the city police in the coproduction of local safety, they now operated merely as "consumers" of this public good. As a result, Ostrom argued, neighborhood crime rates increased significantly.<sup>5</sup>

Subsequent research drew on Ostrom's concept of coproduction to explain development both across and within countries. For example, Evans (1996) shows how what he (1120) calls "complementarity," that is "mutually supportive relations between public and private actors" anchored in a "clear division of labor, based on the contrasting properties of public and private institutions," can contribute to economic development at the national and subnational levels.<sup>6</sup> By showing how interactions among state government, local government and civil society contributed to positive development outcomes across a range of different policy areas in the Brazilian state of Ceara, Tandler (1995) highlighted the importance of a *multilevel* perspective encompassing actors at different *scales*, for example, federal, state and local governments, regional associations and their local affiliates, or national civic and business federations and their subnational affiliates.<sup>7</sup>

One limitation of some of this research for understanding varieties of local security concerns its tendency to deploy a *bilateral* focus limited to government agencies and private firms or, alternatively, to government agencies and citizens. Such a bilateral perspective makes it difficult to see *multilateral* cooperation in provision of security among state, private and community actors. Moreover, while Tandler's work offers an important exception, research on public goods has tended to focus on a single level of analysis, be it local or national, paying less attention to the possibility of *multilevel* cooperation involving actors at different scales, for example, federal, state and local governments, regional associations and their local affiliates, or national civic and business federations and their subnational affiliates.<sup>8</sup> Understanding varieties of local security requires a more complex theoretical framework, one that allows for a broader set of cooperative combinations among public, private and community actors situated at different levels and scales. Moreover, this framework should be attuned to the possibility of *non-cooperation* among actors: for example, citizens may choose not to cooperate with either state or private actors, preferring instead to provide their own security either individually or collectively.

In addition to highlighting multilateral and, to a lesser degree, multilevel production of public goods, recent research offers a third key building block for a theory of local security: a focus on *subnational*, especially local, levels of analysis (Ostrom, 1996; Tandler, 1997; Heller, 2001). Inside countries, and even within a single city, public goods such as security, legal rights, and human

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<sup>5</sup> New Economics Foundation 2008. See also V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1965; E. Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1974, 1978

<sup>6</sup> In an earlier work, Evans (1995) showed how "embedded autonomy," that is, social ties connecting state agencies with private companies facilitates both state capacity and national economic development by enhancing the knowledge and information the state has about society.

<sup>7</sup> See Iverson on "trilateral" institutions.

<sup>8</sup> See the "politics of scale" framework proposed by Yasuda (forthcoming) for an important recent exception.

development are unevenly distributed (O'Donnell 1993; Snyder 2001; Luna and Soifer 2017; Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder (forthcoming)). A subnational focus has thus played an especially prominent role in recent research on non-state provision of public goods (e.g., Cammett 2014; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Allard, Wathen, and Danziger 2015).<sup>9</sup> Yet these studies are mainly concerned with explaining local variation in social welfare provision, not security. And because security and order, unlike social welfare, are often understood to be the *raison d'être* for the state,<sup>10</sup> strictly non-state provision may be far less common in this realm. Hence, understanding varieties of security requires a framework that is attuned to non-state *and* state provision, as well as to the joint production of security by state and non-state actors.

### **Varieties of Security**


To understand varieties of security, it helps to introduce a typology. We focus on domestic security as distinct from national security which focuses on foreign threats, though as we shall see, this line may be blurry in practice. At the broadest level, and as seen in Figure 1, we can distinguish three kinds of security: public, private, and community. Each, in turn, can be disaggregated into subtypes as discussed below. It bears emphasis that we depart from the strict Weberian understanding of the state as having a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force”, in that private and community security officers are also understood to wield force legitimately, though, as discussed below, this legitimacy may be rooted in public delegation and recognition of these private and community enforcers. In highlighting the diverse array of actors involved in crime control, our framework draws on insights from recent research by sociologists and criminologists on “third party” policing, in addition to community policing and private policing [ADD CITATIONS].

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<sup>9</sup> Earlier studies of non-state provision were more national in their focus. See, for example, Bratton 1989; Deaton 1992; Alderman and Praxson 1992; Tripp 1997; Chazan 1994; Dercon 2002; Gough and Wood 2004; Stiglitz 2005. Moreover, as Cammett and MacLean point out (2014, 2), these prior studies were prone to underappreciate “the diversity of possible NSPs [non-state providers].”

<sup>10</sup> Recall the Hobbesian argument justifying the state/“Leviathan”, as well as the subsequent Weberian understanding of the state as an organization with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

**Figure 1. Varieties of Security**



### *Public Security*

Public security is provided by the state, paid for through public revenue and, in principal, is equally available to all citizens. In the modern context, public security generally “trumps” private and community security in two senses. First, the jurisdiction of public security officers supersedes those of private and community officers. Second, the use of the most powerful arms and munitions may be restricted by law to public security forces. A single country will typically have multiple public security forces, sometimes with overlapping jurisdictions and functions, as in the case of national gendarmes and municipal police. Federal systems often have multiple public security forces operating in the same territory. For example, the city of Providence, like other American cities, has its own Department of Public Safety, which includes X armed officers. Yet it also falls under the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island State Police, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the US National Guard. Reservation police in the case of American Indian reservations are a special case of an autonomous public police force.

In principle, the purpose of public security forces is to enforce laws, control crime and provide public order and safety. Moreover, the provision of security, in principal, applies equally to citizens and, presumably, to non-citizens visiting or residing in the territory of a nation-state. *In practice*, however, public security forces do not necessarily adhere to the rule of law, as they, like any state officers, may be corrupt or lack either incentives or capacity to carry out their designated functions. Also, public safety, in practice, is rarely allocated equally to citizens. First, the ability to project public safety to all citizens is partly a function of the resources available to public security forces, which vary greatly both across and within jurisdictions. Moreover, the allocation of these resources is not according to a strict equality principle, with each citizen enjoying equal amounts of public protection. Allocation of public safety forces and infrastructure, instead, may be skewed by resource constraints, with wealthy jurisdictions able to pay for larger and better trained and equipped forces. Political factors may also drive the allocation of public safety assets, with governments responding to lobbying by organized citizens,

or choosing to deploy security assets in support of development projects, favoring areas where businesses are concentrated, or where their voters and partisan constituents cluster. Additionally, the allocation of public security may be skewed by racial and other biases – for example, with citizens of minority groups not receiving equal treatment.

Moreover, public security may be “privatized”, for example when off-duty officers are paid to provide details for private nightclubs, or private organizations may be required by law (liquor licenses; street closure permits; parade permits) to provide security, which may be public security forces hired and paid by the private entity. Private organizations, like universities, may enter into agreements whereby they subsidize public security forces to maintain a robust presence in their area. Brown University, for example, offered a rent-free police substation near its campus and purchased new equipment requested by the Providence Police Department for a new joint University-Providence Police substation in another nearby neighborhood. This example turns the logic of “third party policing”, as articulated by Mazerolle and Ransley (2005), on its head: instead of the police persuading or forcing other organizations to play a role in crime control, it is a private organization, Brown University, that uses its resources to strengthen the police and get them to play a larger role in crime control in the area around the University.

Moreover, organizations that are typically focused on national defense, that is protecting a country from foreign threats, may perform internal security functions, as seen in the robust role of the Mexican armed forces in combatting drug trafficking organizations during the past decade.

### *Private Security*

Private policing is privately funded and is often explicitly or tacitly sanctioned by the state. Examples of private security include company and university security forces (Joh 2006???). Households and citizens that individually arm themselves may also be considered examples of private security. Two key aspects of private security merit emphasis: (1) whether they generate *security externalities* that extend crime control to citizens and territory that do not belong to the private organization; and (2) whether they cooperate and coproduce security with public and/or community security providers.

Private security forces may be tightly confined to the formal territorial limits of the private organization that sponsors them. Alternatively, they may project security and crime prevention beyond their boundaries, for example, when university police are “deputized” and entitled to police areas that extend beyond the property of the university. In this instance, citizens who are not part of the university community, yet reside or work nearby it, may enjoy the extra protection provided by the university police force. Also, there may be a kind of “lighthouse effect,” where private security forces that are tightly confined to the property of their organization may nevertheless enhance crime control beyond these boundaries by virtue of their mere proximity.

Private security may be publicly supported and funded. Indeed, research on “third party policing” notes that police agencies may actively try to coerce third parties, such as business owners, property owners, and parents to take responsibility for preventing crime (Burger and Mazerolle 1998). Moreover, robust private security may have a substitution effect that reduces the presence of public security, potentially freeing up public resources for reallocation to areas lacking private security forces. Alternatively, rather than acting as substitutes, public and private

resources may be mutually reinforcing, with private resources “stacking” onto public security infrastructure, resulting in a greater allocation of public security assets to areas with robust private security. Especially since private security probably correlates with high levels of socioeconomic development, wealthy neighborhoods will thus tend to have multiple and overlapping layers of security.

A key matter, which we discuss below, concerns whether private, public and community security providers stand in positive-sum, synergistic relations, augmenting each other’s capacities and resulting in greater overall security, or alternatively, in a negative-sum relationship, whereby the presence of one type leads to a reduction in the presence of the other types. A third possibility is that there is no interactive relationship among the three types, with each driven by factors unrelated to the presence, capabilities, and goals of the other security providers.

### *Community Security*

While it may be tempting to see this a variant of private security, it is distinguished by the fact that it extends to all the members of the community whether or not they contribute to provision of security, yet is not provided by the state. Examples of community security include neighborhood watch associations, which may be supported with resources or training by the public sector, grassroots community development organizations which play an advocacy role, indigenous community police in the US, Mexico and other Latin American countries, or community vigilante organizations, like the peasant *rondas* in rural Peru and neighborhood defense associations in contemporary Mexico City. Often the main resource of these organizations is their dense social and human capital, although their actual rootedness and embeddedness in communities may vary, especially in polarized and divided communities.

Community security organizations vary in their strategic posture toward the possibility of collaborating with the police. In some cases, community organizations seek to coproduce security with the police. In other cases, community organizations are suspicious of the police and may be unwilling to work with them, seeing the police as either corrupt and inept, or racially biased oppressors. For example, some leaders of the main activist organizations that supported the Providence Community Safety Act (CSA), which placed new legal constraints on local police intended to counter racial profiling and other discriminatory practices, are self-described “abolitionists”, that is, they believe that abolishing public security forces is the best way to improved community safety. The abolitionist perspective is illustrated vividly by the motto of the CSA campaign: “Strong communities make police obsolete.” It bears emphasis that the police, for their part, express little interest in working with such groups, especially when more moderate alternatives that are eager to coproduce security are available in other areas of the city. In communities where abolitionists are the dominant force, local security coproduced by the community and public forces is unlikely.

### *Multilateral Security: Coproduction by Public, Private and Community Actors*

The three types of security can be combined in different ways, as suggested by the shaded areas of overlap among the three circles above in Figure 1. One common combination is community in conjunction with public security. Examples of community-public coproduction include neighborhood watch groups and other community associations that collaborate with the police.

This combination may also include private security, either in the individualized form of home alarm systems and other household or personal safety measures, or in forms that generate positive security externalities, such as privately-funded neighborhood police patrols or university police forces. We call such three-way private, public and community combinations as “trilateral” security, and it may result in security “oases” where public safety is greatly enhanced beyond what any of the separate providers could achieve by themselves acting alone. Another combination is private-public coproduction, as exemplified by a university or company security force that collaborates with the public police, perhaps providing monetary or other incentives to support an increased public police presence, for example, when Brown University offered one of its properties rent-free for the Providence Police to use as a substation.

Depending on the capabilities and strategic postures of public, private and community actors, some types of coproduced security may not be feasible. For example, if local communities are fragmented and divided, community security may not be possible, and, in turn, coproduced security with a community component will not be possible. Alternatively, the public sector may be so poorly equipped or have such a minimal presence in an area that it becomes *de facto* unavailable as a partner for private or community actors in coproduced security. The feasibility of different types of coproduced security also depends on the preferences and strategies of actors. As noted, community groups that adopt an “abolitionist” posture, regarding the police as part of the “problem” of insecurity, are not available for community-public sector coproduction regardless of their capabilities. Likewise, narrowly-focused private security forces that lack an interest in crime control beyond the property they are charged to police are unlikely to be available as partners for coproduced security.

### *Multilevel Security*

In federal systems, different levels of government can work together to produce what can be called *multilevel* security. Alternatively, intergovernmental relations in the area of security and crime control may work at cross-purposes, as illustrated by armed confrontations among federal, state and municipal security forces in Mexico over the past decade in conjunction with operations targeting trafficking of illicit drugs.

### *The International Dimension*

International organizations and other foreign actors may provide aid to buttress domestic security, often in the form of money, training or manpower. This can be seen in the peacekeeping and post-conflict nation-building missions of the United Nations and regional international organizations, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Also, regional cooperation agreements sponsored by the United States government as part of its “War on Drugs” have aimed to strengthen and improve the professionalism of local police forces, as seen in Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative. The US also undertook efforts to train and build police forces, as well as judicial institutions, in post-conflict Afghanistan.

In sum, depending on their capabilities and strategic postures, a host of different actors can potentially produce and coproduce security at the local level. As a result, across small distances there may be different paths toward security and sharply divergent levels of crime.

## Operationalizing the Varieties of Security Framework

To render our theoretical framework fruitful for empirical analysis and to understand the set of feasible types of security available to citizens across locales, we need to measure and map the spatial distribution of public, private and community capabilities for providing security. Moreover, we need to assess empirically the willingness of public, private and community actors to cooperate in coproducing security. Lastly, we need to explore the interactions among the different kinds of providers of security.

### *Measuring and Mapping Public Security*

A good place to start measuring and mapping security is to assess the map that the police themselves use to render “legible” (J. Scott) the area in which they operate. In the case of cities like Providence, the police divide the city into districts and subdistricts, and the assets of the police department – substations, patrols and details (cars, foot, bicycle, and horses in some cases) – are allocated across these districts. To gauge the spatial distribution of public security in Providence, we thus looked initially at the location of substations. As seen in the right-hand side of Figure 2, using GIS tools to define half-mile “service areas” around each of the nine substations, we were able to identify “security deserts,” where the nearest substation was located more than .5 miles away, and “security oases,” where more than one police substations were located less than .5 miles away.<sup>11</sup>

But substations are not like fire stations. That is, they are not manned “24/7” by the police. In fact, we observe striking variance in the level of police activity across substations, with some showing little signs of any use, and others appearing quite active (Figure 3). Others are, as one Providence police officer put it, just way-stations to go to the bathroom and heat up some coffee.<sup>12</sup>

A better measure of the spatial distribution of police assets is patrol posts, which have one on-duty car and officer at all times. This is supplemented by 10 other officers who can be deployed as needed across the city.<sup>13</sup> As seen in Figure 4, the patrol posts correspond to each of the city’s 32 police sub-districts, but unlike substations, they are not fixed points on the map.<sup>14</sup>

Given our interest in local inequalities of security, as well as varieties of security, we explore the distribution of police assets. One way both to measure and assess the equity of this distribution involves a focus on how police assets are distributed relative to the size of the populations residing within administrative units. We adapt the well-known equality principle stipulated by democratic theorists, and encapsulated by the “one person, one vote” ideal which Dahl (1971: 2) defines as a necessary condition for democratic government. From this standpoint, police assets

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<sup>11</sup> Using ARC, we defined areas using the street grid.

<sup>12</sup> Add reference to PVDfest incident here.

<sup>13</sup> Each of the 9 police districts has a sergeant on duty, supplemented by a lieutenant and another lieutenant serving as shift commander.

<sup>14</sup> We assume that the policing effort of patrols is distributed evenly within each patrol post, although further research may reveal that this is not a tenable assumption.

should be distributed across districts and sub-districts in a way that is proportional to their populations.

The map on the left-hand side of Figure 5 shows the number of police patrols per 1000 residents for each of the 32 police sub-districts. This number ranges from a low of .1 patrols to a high of 1, meaning that each citizen residing in the latter sub-district enjoys equivalent of ten times more policing than the former. To generate an overall *policing disproportionality* (POLDIS) score for the distribution of police patrols in terms of population, we modify the formula deployed in research on electoral studies to measure electoral malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder, 1999). We take the absolute value of the difference between each police subdistrict's patrol and population shares, add them, and then divide by two. Thus, the formula is:  $POLDIS = \frac{1}{2} \sum |P_i - R_i|$  where sigma stands for the summation over all subdistricts  $i$ ,  $P_i$  is the percentage of all police assets allocated to subdistrict  $i$ , and  $R_i$  is the percentage of the overall population residing in subdistrict  $i$ . Using this formula, with police assets understood as "patrols," we calculate an overall POLDIS score of .14 for Providence. This score means that 14 percent of the city's police assets (again, defined as patrols) are allocated to subdistricts that would not receive those assets if there were perfect apportionment.<sup>15</sup>

To help interpret this result, it bears emphasis that, at the broadest level, the distribution of police assets can be characterized as either perfectly apportioned or disproportional. In a perfectly-apportioned law enforcement system, indicated by a POLDIS score of **0**, no citizen would enjoy more police protection than any other by virtue of the location in which they reside. In a disproportional system, by contrast, some residents receive more police protection than others. In the most extreme case, as indicated by a POLDIS score of **1.0**, a disproportional system might allocate all police assets to a single resident with their own sub-district, and the rest of the population would receive no police protection. No real-world law enforcement system approximates this extreme. Still, we expect that most have some degree of policing disproportionality.

Of course, it is by no means self-evident that the distribution of police assets, or any other state assets, for that matter, should be guided by the democratic principle of equality. Perhaps police assets should be distributed proportionally not by population but by crime rates? To assess policing disproportionality using the territorial distribution of rates of crime, POLDISc, as the benchmark for assessing equity, we introduce a modified formula:  $POLDISc = \frac{1}{2} \sum |P_i - C_i|$  where sigma stands for the summation over all subdistricts  $i$ ,  $P_i$  is the percentage of all police assets allocated to subdistrict  $i$ , and  $C_i$  is the percentage of overall incidents of crime occurring in subdistrict  $i$ . [POLDISc CALCULATION FOR PVD FORTHCOMING]. As seen in the left-hand map in Figure 5, the violent crime rate varies widely across Providence neighborhoods, ranging from highs of 78.8 and 56.3 violent crimes per 1000 residents in Downtown and Upper South Providence respectively, to lows of 2.7 and 3.4 violent crimes per 1000 in the Blackstone and Wayland neighborhoods respectively. By eyeballing both maps in Figure 6, we can draw a preliminary conclusion that the distribution of policing across neighborhoods is indeed

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<sup>15</sup> Our measure does not take into account the additional 10 officers on duty during many shifts, who, as noted above, can be deployed across the city as needed. We do not currently have data on how these extra "units" of policing are, in fact, distributed. Hence, we must remain agnostic about how these extra "units" of policing affect overall disproportionality.

disproportional with respect to violent crime rates. For example, Blackstone seems to receive more police assets than its low violent crime rate might warrant, whereas Upper South Providence and Olneyville appear to receive fewer police assets than their high crime rates appear to warrant.

A caveat to keep in mind concerns the likely endogeneity of crime rates and the allocation of police assets. Indeed, the low crime rates in a neighborhood such as Blackstone may result in part from the apparent overallocation of police assets in response to higher crime rates during a prior period. Consequently, what appears to be overallocation of police resources may, in fact, be the lagged result of an appropriate allocation based on higher crime rates in an earlier period. Longitudinal time-series data on crime rates, as well as allocation of police assets, will be helpful in untangling matters such as these.

### *Measuring and Mapping Private Security*

The Providence Police are not the only police force in the city. Several university and college police forces also operate in Providence.<sup>16</sup> While the officers of some of these private police forces carry weapons, some do not. However, the provision of security by these police forces is by no means strictly a function of their weaponry, or lack of it. Rather, they control and prevent crime through their high-visibility as a uniformed force with clearly-marked police vehicles. Moreover, their close collaborative relations they often enjoy with the Providence Police Department, as illustrated through the sharing of substations (e.g., Brown University, Johnson and Wales University) seen in Figure 7, serves to enhance the capabilities of both the university and city police.

Private university police forces can be quite large: for example, with 52 sworn officers, the Brown University Police Department (BUPD) is the fifth largest police force in the state of Rhode Island, and they may be better-equipped than the regular police, which depend on often fiscally-strapped local governments. The jurisdiction of these police forces often extends beyond the formal limits of the campus to include streets, sidewalks and other areas around the campus. In urban settings, the extension of the jurisdiction of private police beyond the university or college's property is especially likely because dormitories, classrooms and other university buildings may be interspersed with non-university property, including public city streets.

In addition to college and university police, companies, private residences, and even neighborhoods may also have private security that can project security beyond the formal limits of the domains they patrol. However, in Providence, as in many other American cities,, the sheer size and amount of territory and people (students, faculty, staff) under university and college jurisdiction leads their security forces to approximate full-fledged police forces far more closely than, say, a company's security force.<sup>17</sup> University and college police forces are therefore more

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<sup>16</sup> The presence of private police forces, especially ones that bear arms, seems to be a peculiarly American phenomenon, perhaps rooted in the same "liberal creed" (L. Hertz) that produced the right of citizens to bear arms as enshrined in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment of the US Constitution. Latin American colleagues, for example, are often surprised to learn that many US universities are protected by armed private security forces, as this would be unimaginable in their countries. This observation is relevant in assessing the portability of our framework beyond the case of the US.

<sup>17</sup> Moreover, because many private businesses in Providence tend to cluster in the same areas as universities, namely downtown and in the wealthier East Side, the impact of their private security is likely correlated closely with that of the universities.

likely than other forms of private security to produce “security externalities” which effectively extend their protective umbrella to citizens who reside or work near campus yet do not belong to the university itself.

Figure 7 provides a map of the patrol areas of university and college police forces in Providence. Together, these patrol areas encompass a significant share of the total area of the city [ADD THIS CALCULATION]. However, they are not distributed evenly across the city: the East Side of Providence has multiple and overlapping patrol areas, whereas most neighborhoods across the city, especially on the West and Southwest sides, do not have a university police force. As suggested by their peripheral location near the boundaries of the city, the campuses of Providence College in Elmhurst, Rhode Island College (RIC) in Mount Pleasant, and Johnson and Wales University in Washington Park are best characterized as enclaves that do not fit the pattern of urban embeddedness described above and seen in the campuses located on the East Side and Downtown. Consequently, we expect the projection of security beyond campus is far weaker among these peripheral campuses.

As seen in Figure 9, when public and private university and college police forces are combined, we observe a very heavy spatial concentration of policing on the East Side and Downtown. Moreover, the evidence we find of close collaboration among university and city police suggests that this spatial concentration and stacking has an additive, rather than a zero-sum or negative-sum, effect on overall levels of security. Combining city and university police forces also results in a large increase in overall policing disproportionality across Providence, with POLDIS rising nearly three-fold from .14, without counting university police forces, to .34 with them. In short, Providence residents who reside near the cluster of universities located on the East Side and Downtown, enjoy a far higher level of safety than their neighbors across the rest of the city.

### *Measuring and Mapping Community Security*

Operationalizing the third type of security, *community*, requires assessing the strength and strategies of local civil society, including neighborhood associations, and a host of other kinds of grassroots organizations which focus on safety. Here we will draw on Baiocchi et al., as well as the Tocquevillian-inspired work by Putnam, Sampson et al (1997), and others focusing on “social capital.” [TO BE CONTINUED...]

Community organizations vary not just in their capabilities but also in their strategies and objectives. To understand varieties of local security it is thus especially helpful to scrutinize the posture of community organizations toward coproduction with other kinds of actors, especially the city police. As discussed above, there is a notable distinction between “moderate” organizations that are willing to partner with the city police and even private police, and “radical” organizations, who eschew cooperation with the police and, in some cases, seek to abolish them.<sup>18</sup> One interesting issue concerns the influence of property ownership on these postures. In Providence, there seems to be a correlation between home ownership and community organizations, like neighborhood watches, that are open to working with the city police. Figure

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<sup>18</sup> Anti-police abolitionists may be considered a contemporary form of “anarchism” – add cites to this literature as well as the “legal cynicism” literature (Black 1983, etc.).

10 offers an initial and tentative mapping of community organizations according to both their strengths and strategies.

### **Varieties of Security in Providence, RI**

To show the utility of our framework for understanding how security can be achieved in different ways at the local level, we focus on four neighborhoods in Providence: East Side, West Side, Olneyville and South Side. The capabilities and strategies of public, private and community providers differ across the neighborhoods, resulting, in turn, in four distinct pathways toward local security.

#### *Trilateral Coproduction: Public-Private-Community Partnership and a “Security Oasis” on the East Side*

On the East Side of Providence, private, public, and community providers work synergistically to coproduce security. This outcome, which we call “trilateral coproduction,” offers citizens three layers of security, whereas the traditional, state-centered view of security would only predict a single layer (i.e., the city police). Trilateral coproduction, in turn, results in a kind of “security oasis,” where security is both abundant in supply and readily available to citizens.<sup>19</sup>

The residents of the East Side are served not only by the Providence Police Department but also by several university police forces, notably the Brown University Police and the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) Police. As noted above, the Brown University Police Department (BUPD) is an armed force with sworn police officers, meaning they, like Providence police officers, are authorized to legally carry a firearm and make arrests. With 52 such officers, many of whom came to Brown with prior law enforcement experience, the BUPD is the fifth largest police force in Rhode Island. Moreover, our field observations suggest that the financial resources available to the Brown and RISD Police exceed those of the public department. The Brown and RISD patrol cars, for example, are notably of a higher quality than the Providence Police vehicles.

Recognizing the existence of such an alternative, private policing apparatus is important. Yet, the coproduction of security requires not only the presence of multiple security actors but also *cooperation* among them. In this regard, we find clear evidence of meaningful cooperation between the Providence and university police forces. For example, Brown University police officers routinely attend the regular meetings of the Providence Police units that patrol the East Side. These meetings and the relationships built there offer important conduits for information-sharing between the two forces. Officers from Brown and the Providence Police even share office-space in two joint substations funded by both parties.

Moreover, Brown University provides inducements for the Providence Police to maintain an active presence near its property. For example, the University has purchased equipment for the Providence police and provides rent-free space for an additional police substation near the University (See Figure 8). Field observations suggest this substation is one of the most well-kept substations in Providence. It has an updated interior and exterior, consistently has at least one officer available to receive visitors, and numerous Providence police vehicles are usually parked

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<sup>19</sup> The notion of a “security oasis,” and its antonym “security desert,” draw on the concept of “food desert” from the field of Geography.

nearby. Most other Providence Police substations, by contrast, appear unkempt and even unmanned. This cooperative relationship between the public and private police forces on the East Side enhances the provision of security by both parties. The Brown and RISD private police forces benefit from information-sharing and the presence and backing of the city police, whereas the Providence police gain important information and additional resources from these private sources. As a result, these private and public organizations are able to provide greater security through cooperation than they could alone.

This coproduction of security by public and private police forces is supplemented by community provision through a vibrant set of Neighborhood Watch Associations and tightly-networked, vigilant neighbors. Many residents carry out their own private security activities, such as installing home security systems and security cameras. They also actively employ social network tools like Facebook, online forums, e-mail lists and group texts that inform neighbors about crime in their neighborhood and coordinate their efforts against it. The most active neighbors participate in neighborhood watch groups that keep them informed about local crime trends and threats to neighborhood security.

While the mere presence of this active network of vigilant neighbors alone bolsters security on the East Side, the community's penchant for vigorous cooperation with both public and private providers yields further benefits through coproduction. The neighborhood watch groups of the East Side work closely with both the Providence and university police forces. Police officers attend meetings of the neighborhood watch groups, providing updates and information about crime in the area. They also educate the neighbors about crime prevention and police operations. The residents further benefit from monthly, in-person access to a law enforcement representative with whom they can voice complaints and make requests for additional or different security. Moreover, members of neighborhood watch groups frequently have the cell-phone numbers of police officers in their area, giving them direct access to these officials.

For the police forces, neighborhood residents are vital sources of information and on-the-ground contacts that can enhance crime prevention and response. Considering that the East Side is heavily populated by Brown and RISD students and faculty, this is true for both the city and university police forces. The police also benefit when they educate citizens about how to take greater responsibility for their own security. Such self-help tools can reduce the burden on police forces.

In sum, East Side residents enjoy three synergistic layers of security. The trilateral coproduction of security among public, private and community providers allows each group to provide better security than they could alone. Moreover, the benefits of crime control and prevention generated by university police forces are not confined just to members of the university community: nearby residents who do not belong to the university are also safer when Brown or RISD police deter criminals. As a result of this trilateral coproduction, the East Side is a security oasis.

### *Bilateral Coproduction:*

#### *Public-Community Partnership, Gentrification and Increased Security on the West Side*

The presence of large private police forces, like the University police of the East Side, is more the exception than the rule. Indeed, most neighborhoods in Providence, like those in other cities, do not have universities in their midst. How, then, can robust security be achieved in the more common scenario where private providers are absent? To address this question, we turn to the West Side of Providence, where, despite the lack of private providers, robust security is nevertheless achieved through *bilateral* coproduction between community organizations and the Providence Police.

Community involvement in crime prevention is especially notable on the West Side. It is not uncommon for residents in this area to have home security systems, including security cameras which have been used to support police in criminal investigations. Also, the neighbors work together to prevent crime. In interviews, residents spoke of keeping watch over their neighbors' houses and collaborating with neighbors to scare away potential thieves.

Moreover, this gentrifying, middle-income, predominately white area of the city is home to West Broadway Neighborhood Association (WBNA). Founded over 30 years ago, the WBNA grew as a response to the lack of government support from the City of Providence for maintenance of the many historical homes for which the neighborhood is known. Although the membership of the WBNA initially consisted mainly of homeowners, the leadership has increasingly aimed to be more inclusive, especially towards renters. The WBNA has its own freestanding, dedicated building, and the revenue from membership dues supports a lively program of activities. It holds regular meetings, bi-annual street cleanups, and coordinates vigilance over derelict neighborhood houses. While well-maintained homes and garbage-free streets may not fit the traditional understanding of security, which centers on law enforcement and crime control, our interviews with WBNA members and field observations suggest that residents value such "quality of life" improvements, seeing them as contributing both to higher property prices and a safer neighborhood.

All the security measures on the West Side discussed so far are community-driven activities carried out by neighbors and the WBNA independently of the police. However, the WBNA also maintains a vibrant coproductive relationship with the city police, primarily through its Crime Watch group. As seen on the East Side, a police lieutenant also attends Crime Watch meetings on the West Side, and the Captain of the Providence Police makes himself available for meetings when crime escalates in the area. The city police view the WBNA as an effective and valuable partner. In fact, at one **meeting of the West Side's Crime Watch that we observed**, the police representative discussed two types of Crime Watches: one, which includes this Association, that aid the police in making arrests by acting quickly to share information both among themselves and with the police; and the other, which, in his words, break down into squabbling and critiques of law enforcement.

The WBNA success at partnering with law enforcement has drawn attention and praise from city and state politicians. Indeed, the WBNA enjoys considerable political clout, as indicated by its routine contact with local politicians. The Association's Crime Watch meetings often include efforts to teach members the "how-to's" of contacting their local officials and lobbying for their

political and economic interests, and a representative of the Providence Mayor's Office occasionally attends meetings. The WBNA also hosts a well-attended annual public event, "Conversation with Our Elected Officials," where the Mayor, City Councilors, and State legislators attend to discuss problems facing the neighborhood, including crime. To critics of the WBNA, such as the leaders of radical community organizations like DARE and PRYSM (see the discussion below of the South Side) who regard it as an exclusionary tool for gentrification, the Association's close relationship with elected officials and the police are taken as evidence of its cooptation by external powerbrokers with agendas that do not serve the interests of the community.

Both the community and the police benefit from this cooperation, much in the same ways that the community and public police in the East Side benefit. The residents gain special access to a law enforcement representative with whom they can voice complaints and/or make requests for additional or different security. Like on the East Side, Association members frequently have the cell-phone numbers of police officers in their area. For the police, neighborhood residents are vital sources of information that can enhance crime prevention and response. In WBNA meetings, the police officers in attendance often highlighted stories of when neighbors helped police catch criminals. Like the trilateral coproductive relationship described in the East Side, the West Side's public-community binary cooperation allows each group of collaborators to provide better security than they could alone. Despite the absence of private security providers, which makes it impossible for the residents of the West Side to achieve the trilateral security enjoyed by their neighbors on the East Side, the West Side is nevertheless able to improve local security bilaterally through a strong public-community partnership.

It bears emphasis that the WBNA operates in a *middle-income* neighborhood. As a result, residents are able to draw on their own financial resources to make safety-enhancing investments such as home-security systems. Moreover, since the WBNA funds its activities through private dues, the middle-income nature of its membership offers an advantage.<sup>20</sup> In low-income areas, by contrast, where personal and community financial resources are scarcer and where neighborhood relations with the police are likely to be less congenial, bilateral coproduction of security may be far more difficult.

#### *Multilevel Coproduction:*

##### *Federal-City-Community Partnership and Increased Security in Olneyville*

Consider a low-income neighborhood with very few home owners. How can security be enhanced in the face of scarce financial resources? The case of Olneyville, a low-income neighborhood with more than 50 percent Latino households, offers an interesting example of how local security can be improved in a low-income setting through an innovative multilevel assemblage that combines a community's resources with those of the federal and local governments.

In Olneyville, residents have been increasingly concerned about a perceived rise in insecurity in recent years, which they attribute partly to a lack of adequate police forces in the area. As we

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<sup>20</sup> The West Side may be especially well-organized in its response to crime—both independently and by working with the city police—due to high collective efficacy among neighborhood residents stemming from their relatively high level of homeownership (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997: 919; Sampson: 2012).

have seen, on the East and West Sides of Providence, the engagement of well-financed community and private organizations in the provision of security helped bolster and complement the efforts of the city police. In Olneyville, residents have devised other ways to enhance local security.

Olneyville residents have successfully engaged two different levels of government, federal and city, to improve their neighborhood security. This *multilevel coproduction* of security was spearheaded by the Olneyville Housing Corporation (OHC), a long-standing non-profit organization whose mission is to revitalize the neighborhood by spurring economic growth and creating affordable housing opportunities, mainly by aiding first-time, low-income homebuyers.<sup>21</sup> In partnership with Project RENEW/Weber, the Providence Housing Authority, Roger Williams University's School of Justice Studies, and the Providence Police Department, the OHC applied for and received a federal Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Grant, administered by the US Department of Justice as part of the Obama Administration's Promise Zones Initiative. Worth more than half a million dollars, the grant "support[s] community policing initiatives, neighborhood revitalization and resident police partnerships in order to reduce crime, increase collective efficacy and build positive public safety perceptions of Olneyville." In short, a community-based non-profit organization applied successfully to the federal government for funds to hire City Police to provide extra security in the neighborhood. As a result of the combined efforts of the community, the city police, and the federal government, Olneyville was patrolled by two additional police officers. Through the Byrne Grants, the federal government thus provided financial incentives that induced cooperation between local law enforcement and community organizations to enhance security.

The case of Olneyville exemplifies a multi-level assemblage where community organizations aim to bolster local security by tapping into federal resources that local law enforcement would have difficulty accessing by itself. In this case, the professional staff of a local non-profit agency augmented the city government's capacity by both applying for and administering a large, mutually beneficial grant.<sup>22</sup>

The three neighborhoods discussed thus far illustrate various forms of coproduction. How can security be improved in situations where coproduction across the public-private-community divide is not an option? To explore this outcome, we turn to Providence's South Side.

### *Community Self-Provision: An Impossible Public-Community Partnership and a "Security Desert" on the South Side*

Compared to the three other neighborhoods, the South Side is insecure and has higher crime rates. The South Side is comprised of a largely minority population, many of whom do not speak English as their first language. The area has a low SES, with many residents living below the poverty line. Moreover, residents tend to view the city police with mistrust because of a

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<sup>21</sup> In contrast to the WBNA, the OHC appears not to rely on membership dues to fund its activities. Indeed, with an Executive Director and at least 3 staffers, the OHC, now renamed as ONE Neighborhood Builders, seems to operate more like a professional organization than a neighborhood association. **This distinction will be fleshed out in our future research.**

<sup>22</sup> Moreover, as one member of the Providence Police Department explained, an application for the Byrne Grant from the city police alone was understood to stand a far lesser chance of approval than a joint application together with community stakeholders.

perceived history of abuse of power and racial or ethnic discrimination. Residents speak frequently of racial profiling and antagonistic interactions with law enforcement officers, and some even regard the police as a greater threat to their security than criminals. These experiences are an important reminder that preventing crime is not the same as providing security.

The South Side is thus a challenging place for providing security. The conventional provider, the city police, appears deficient at best and abusive at worst. In contrast to other Providence neighborhoods, especially the East and West sides, private security does not seem to be a feasible option on the South Side because the costs of private security are likely beyond the means of most South Side residents. Moreover, the antagonistic relationship between the city police and many South Side residents makes it very difficult to forge public-community partnerships for security like those that emerged on the West Side and in Olneyville.

In the face of these constraints, the communities of the South Side have turned to self-help provision of security. These efforts are led and coordinated by a pair of grassroots organizations with base of support that, while spread across the city, is concentrated in the South Side: Direct Action for Rights and Equality (DARE) and the Providence Student Youth Movement (PrYSM). Both organizations focus on publicizing and countering police abuses, building community resilience, and educating residents about how to provide for their own security without relying on the city police. In recent years, DARE and PrYSM jointly led a campaign in support of a new piece of legislation, the Community Safety Act (CSA), intended to improve civilian oversight of police misbehavior and to increase police accountability. According to PrYSM's Community Defense Project, the organization's objective is to "reclaim our streets and take safety back into our own hands." And, as signaled clearly by the slogan, "strong communities make police obsolete," which was included on joint DARE-PrYSM posters, flyers and bulletins supporting the CSA, these organizations view the police not as a potential partner but as a force to be resisted, heavily regulated and even abolished. The CSA was approved by the City Council and voted into law at the beginning of 2017. While it remains to be seen how this new legislation will function in practice, the CSA campaign offers an intriguing example of an innovative community-led strategy to improve security in low-income settings where residents see the police not as a potential partner but as a major threat to their safety. By mobilizing citizens across the city and vigorously lobbying City Assembly members in support of the CSA, DARE and PrYSM aimed to harness the legislative process as a tool for regulating and changing police behavior in ways that improve local security.

Not surprisingly, the police express little interest in collaborating with these South Side community organizations. Indeed, the Providence police union strongly and vocally opposed the CSA, as seen in the remarks of its leader, who stated:

*The Community Safety Act is not a community meaning the residents of the city of Providence... It's a small community of people, and quite a few of them have an agenda — a dislike or distrust of police to begin with (O'Brien 2017).*

Interviews with members of the Providence Police Department reveal that moderate community groups like the WBNA and OHC are praised as "models" to be replicated in other neighborhoods,

whereas radical organizations like DARE and PrYSM are dismissed as “negative” civil society to be avoided.

Thus, in many respects, the South and East Sides stand as polar opposites. Whereas on the East Side public, private, and community forces worked together to coproduce a “security oasis,” on the South Side, where private security is absent and the dominant community organizations view the police as an unwelcome occupying force and focus on self-help security, the outcome is more accurately described as a “security desert.”

## **Conclusion**

The public good of local safety can be provided by a host of public, private and community agents combining in a multiplicity of different ways. Even in a small American city like Providence, we observe striking variation in the provision of local security across neighborhoods. To describe and explain these local varieties of security, we propose a multilateral, multilevel and subnational framework. In conjunction with new techniques for measuring the territorial distribution of security assets, such as the novel measures of *police disproportionality* (POLDIS) that we introduce, this framework offers a far stronger understanding not only of “who is safe,” but also how and why. In addition to refining our measures and theory, in future research we will test their external validity in a sample of cities in the US and beyond.

Figure 2. Mapping Public Security I:  
The Spatial Distribution of Police Sub-Stations in Providence, RI




Figure 3. Police Substations in Providence, RI




Figure 4. Mapping Public Security II: Police Patrol Posts



Figure 5. Disproportional Public Security I: Spatial Distribution of Policing in Providence, 2010 (by population of police sub-district)







Figure 6. Disproportional Public Security II:  
Spatial Distribution of Crime and Policing in Providence, RI (2010)



Unequal Security: Spatial Density of Violent Crime in Providence, RI, 2010




Figure 7. Private Security: University Police in Providence, RI




Figure 8: Public-Private Coproduction of Security




Figure 9. Combining Public and Private Security




Figure 10. Strength and Strategies of Security-Providing Organizations in Providence, RI

